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RECONSTRUCTING THE RACE-SEX ANALOGY

SERENA MAYERI*
ABSTRACT
In the standard account, American sex equality law rests on a
partial and imperfect analogy to race, developed in the 1970s by
feminists intent on establishing formal equality between men and
women, and embraced, albeit selectively and uneasily, by lawmakers
and judges. But this account, although containing important
elements of truth, obscures the creative ways that advocates turned
the tables, arguing that principles developed in sex equality
jurisprudence could expand the availability of remedies for racial
injustice. This Article explores one example of this phenomenon:
efforts, led by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to use the emerging constitutional distinction between detrimental and beneficial sex classifications as a precedent supporting and justifying the constitutionality
of race-based affirmative action. Feminists faced a series of analogical crises in the mid-1970s, including the collision of “benign” sex
classifications and race-based affirmative action in the Court, and
the Justices’ failure to see pregnancy discrimination as an equal
protection violation. In response, feminists reformulated the race-sex
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For valuable
comments and conversations at various stages of this project, special thanks are due to
Nancy Cott, Anne Coughlin, Jane DeHart, William Eskridge, Glenda Gilmore, Risa
Goluboff, Robert W. Gordon, Sarah Barringer Gordon, Laura Kalman, Seth Kreimer,
Deborah Malamud, William Nelson, Rebecca Rix, Theodore Ruger, Reva Siegel, Amy Wax,
David Wilkins, and participants in the Legal History Colloquium at New York University
School of Law, the New York Law and Humanities workshop, the Second Annual
Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, and faculty workshops
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, University of Virginia School of Law,
Brooklyn Law School, and St. John’s University School of Law. For intrepid research
assistance, I am grateful to Alvin Dong and Ke Wan, John Jacob of the Powell Archives at
Washington and Lee University School of Law, and the staffs of the Library of Congress and
the Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania.
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analogy, attentive to differences as well as similarities between race
and sex inequality. They also sought to apply their hard won gains
in sex equality cases to the race context, arguing that the Court’s
openness to “genuine affirmative action” for women should extend to
racial minorities. The narrow failure of this strategy to win a Court
majority had lasting consequences, including a problematic
divergence between race and sex equality doctrines and the submergence of gender, work, and family issues in the affirmative action
debate. The reconstructed analogy she developed as an advocate,
however, remains alive in Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence, and
recovering its history suggests the need for a reassessment of both
legal feminist advocacy and constitutional equality law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the context of American law, we are accustomed to thinking
about race-sex analogies as a mostly one-way street. Indeed, in the
postwar United States, it was the African American civil rights
movement that laid the groundwork and developed the legal
templates for the diverse array of social movements that followed.1
Beginning in the early 1960s, feminists increasingly began to revive
the analogy to race, once a staple of nineteenth century women’s
rights agitation. By the early 1970s they had achieved considerable
success in what once seemed an improbable quest.2 As the 1970s
wore on, legal feminism confronted the analogy’s limits—both
descriptive and political—which rendered race jurisprudence less
useful than it seemed at first.3 But that narrative of declension, as
important as it is, is only part of the story.4 In response to changing
political and legal conditions, feminists and their allies have also
used concepts developed in sex equality doctrine as precedents to
justify a more expansive race jurisprudence. They laid the groundwork for this reconstructed analogy in the mid-1970s, when the
limits of the race-sex analogy as previously articulated became
clear.5 This reciprocity was complex and multifaceted, spanning an
array of doctrines and time frames. This Article recovers one strand
of that reciprocal relationship, examining how advocates and their
judicial allies argued that sex equality jurisprudence could and
should be a template for the constitutional treatment of race-based
affirmative action.
1. On this phenomenon generally, see JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).
2. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: LEGAL FEMINISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA (forthcoming) [hereinafter MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE]; Serena Mayeri, Note, “A
Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective,
110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1052-60 (2001) [hereinafter Mayeri, A Common Fate].
3. See Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 2, at 1072-80; Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 742-46 (2002).
4. Cf. Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 765, 766-67 (2002); Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply
to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 819, 820-23 (2002).
5. See Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 2, at 1046.
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In the early 1970s, feminist constitutional litigators saw their
primary task as convincing the Court that sex-based legal distinctions were, by and large, the product of an outdated and invidious
ideology that consigned women to the separate and often inferior
sphere of home, family, and lifelong economic dependence. The
analogy to race helped feminists persuade judges and other legal
decision makers that discrimination based on sex was worthy of
similar attention and eradication, and they came within one vote of
a Court majority in the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson.6 But by
the middle of the decade, as Part I of this Article recounts, the racesex analogy had become a double-edged sword for feminists and
their allies. The collision of “benign” sex classifications and racebased affirmative action in the Supreme Court and the Court’s
failure to treat pregnancy discrimination as a constitutional
violation drove home the analogy’s substantive and strategic
limitations.7
Feminists did not stand idly by as their race-sex analogy
foundered. Instead, as Part II demonstrates, they reformulated the
analogy to reflect what they saw as important differences between
race and sex inequality and to harness the emerging potential of sex
equality jurisprudence to provide a template for addressing the
increasingly thorny issue of race-based affirmative action. Their
ability to do this depended upon their quiet success in persuading
the Court to distinguish between so-called “benign” sex-based
classifications that perpetuated women’s dependent and subordinate status and those designed to promote economic opportunity
and independence, a synthesis that occurred in the relatively
obscure and short per curiam opinion in Califano v. Webster.8 Of
course, the distinction between benign and invidious discrimination
had deep roots in the advocacy, scholarship, and jurisprudence
combating racial segregation and discrimination. But ironically, it
was in the context of sex equality jurisprudence, in which feminist
lawyers have been accused of taking a rigid formal equality
approach, that a principled distinction between invidious classifications and “genuine affirmative action” won the endorsement of a
6. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
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majority of Justices. The development of this distinction frustrated
some who doubted judges’ ability to reliably separate the wheat
from the chaff, but it inspired others, most prominently Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, to explore the applicability of sex equality precedents to
race jurisprudence.
This reconstructed, or “reverse,” analogy had a number of
advantages for advocates. Most obviously, it portended a lower level
of scrutiny for classifications designed to enhance opportunities for
historically disadvantaged groups. But as Ginsburg and others
recognized, the reverse analogy’s potential extended beyond the
mechanical application of a less stringent standard of review. More
importantly, the standard articulated in Webster invoked a substantive conception of equal protection that recognized societal
discrimination as a sufficient justification for affirmative action.
Further, it shifted the focus of the inquiry away from harm to third
parties, such as men and whites, and toward avoiding the stigmatization of the disadvantaged groups affirmative action was designed
to help. The approach the Justices had accepted with little fanfare
in Webster seemed an ideal template for deciding the highly
publicized, bitterly controversial Bakke case.9
It was not to be. Like the race-sex parallel advanced in Frontiero,
the reformulated sex-race analogy came within one vote of adoption
by the Justices, and once again Justice Powell cast the deciding
vote.10 This time, his opinion would come to be seen as speaking
for the Court. The import of the Bakke decision, and Powell’s
opinion in particular, is of course well-known, but its significance
for the relationship between sex and race jurisprudence is underappreciated. Powell’s opinion in Bakke not only remade affirmative
action doctrine by elevating diversity as a government interest and
subjecting race-based university admissions policies to strict
scrutiny, but it also short-circuited attempts to use sex equality
doctrine as conceptual and constitutional support for race-based
remedial programs. Part II.C details the debate inside the Court
over the proper role of sex equality precedents in the evaluation
of race-based affirmative action cases. Although a plurality of
9. See discussion infra Part II.B.
10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978).
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Justices, led by Justice Brennan, deployed the sex equality
precedents to advance principles developed over many years in the
race context, Justice Powell’s opinion explicitly rejected the sex-race
parallel.
Part III explores the post-Bakke history of the reconstructed sexrace analogy in affirmative action law and discourse. The disjuncture between the constitutional doctrines of race and sex equality
that emerged in the late 1970s endures to this day. Not only did the
two doctrines diverge, but the law and discourse of affirmative
action neglects or submerges many of the concerns that have
motivated sex equality advocacy, including work-family conflict and
the accommodation of women’s reproductive difference. Even so, the
“reverse analogy” championed by legal feminists and affirmative
action proponents in the 1970s did not disappear. The final section
of Part III traces the theme of doctrinal convergence through
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in recent equal protection cases.
Finally, the conclusion proposes that recovering this history may
help us rethink the legacy of legal feminism. Legal feminist strategy
and judicial decisions in the sex equality area have been subject to
penetrating criticism since the 1970s. Without suggesting that they
provide a panacea, past or present, this Article suggests how the
history of feminist reconstructions of race-sex analogies may
support a more optimistic, as well as a more complicated, reading
of sex equality advocacy and jurisprudence.
We have grown used to considering sex discrimination, and
certainly sex-based affirmative action, as an afterthought rather
than an antecedent. Prohibitions on sex discrimination, we are
often reminded, appear nowhere in the federal Constitution, and
were added to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a cynical
segregationist ploy, albeit one successfully exploited by resourceful
advocates for women.11 Indeed, many of sex equality doctrine’s
shortcomings have, not without justification, been laid at the feet
of overzealous adherence to a race analogy.12 Reconsidering the
11. On the absence of “women” from the Constitution, see Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73539. On the addition of “sex” to Title VII, see Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII:
Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 163 (1991); Mayeri,
A Common Fate, supra note 2, at 1063-67.
12. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She the
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direction of this arrow through the lens of history can help us to
appreciate the historical contingency of our current doctrinal
framework, and the complex and often paradoxical nature of the
relationship between race and sex equality in law, as well as in life.
Moreover, through the eyes of historical actors, we can see constitutional sex equality jurisprudence not merely as a faint echo of race
doctrine, or an uneasy compromise between “equality” and “difference,” but as a potentially fruitful source of substantive ideals
applicable in other contexts.
In his dissent in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the 1995
decision striking down a race-based federal contracting set-aside,
Justice John Paul Stevens lamented the “anomalous result”
produced by the majority’s application of strict scrutiny to all racebased classifications.13 Paradoxically, he observed, gender-based
affirmative action was now less constitutionally vulnerable than
affirmative policies based on race, despite the historical mission of
the Equal Protection Clause—to protect formerly enslaved African
Americans.14 As this Article will show, the “anomalous result” itself
had a long history, and its ascendancy was far from inevitable.
I. ANALOGICAL CRISIS15
Analogizing sex to race served as an important and often effective
strategy for feminist lawyers as they sought to convince judges and
other legal decision makers that sex discriminatory laws, long seen
as benign or even protective, perpetuated inequality and deserved
both moral disapprobation and legal remediation. By the mid1970s, however, developments within and outside the law made the
analogy to race increasingly problematic. An economic downturn fed
People].
13. 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. Stevens remarked:
[T]oday’s lecture about “consistency” will produce the anomalous result that the
Government can more easily enact affirmative-action programs to remedy
discrimination against women than it can enact affirmative-action programs to
remedy discrimination against African-Americans—even though the primary
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the
former slaves.
Id.
15. I borrow this term from Sullivan, supra note 3, at 742.
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skepticism and outright hostility toward affirmative action—
particularly race-based policies—and the rise of economic and
cultural conservatism provided intellectual and political ammunition to critics. This Part focuses on the doctrinal manifestations
of this larger social shift. The first section briefly recapitulates
the advantages of analogical reasoning for feminists as they argued
early 1970s sex equality cases in court. The second and third
sections describe two important doctrinal developments, both
occurring in 1974, that reflected the diminishing utility of the racesex analogy as previously articulated by feminist litigators.
A. The Appeal of Analogical Reasoning: The Early Sex Equality
Cases
By the early 1970s, feminists had resolved their own internal
disputes over whether protective laws were havens safeguarding
women from exploitation in an unfair and unequal world or archaic
relics of old-fashioned sexist condescension and exclusion. Most who
clung to these laws during part or all of the 1960s had come to
believe them worth sacrificing at the altar of equality. The result
was an unprecedented consensus that women should seek improvement in their legal and constitutional status through multiple
avenues—legislation, litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and advocacy of an Equal Rights Amendment.16 Feminists more or
less agreed that laws classifying women as weaker beings in need
of protection and special consideration were shackles rather than
stepping stones; as they were fond of saying, women’s “pedestal,”
upon closer inspection, often revealed itself to be a “cage.”17 As
commentators noted then and now, it was this conviction that led
legal feminists like Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her colleagues to
argue vehemently for the elimination of sex-based classifications
from the law—for a version of equality that brooked no distinctions
of sex unless a strictly physical and immutable difference was
16. On the development of this hard-won consensus, see Serena Mayeri, Constitutional
Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004)
[hereinafter Mayeri, Constitutional Choices].
17. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 744 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973) (plurality opinion)).
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involved.18 Simultaneously, feminists were campaigning for an
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), designed to codify the equality
principle in the federal Constitution and obviate the need for
reinterpretation of existing constitutional provisions.19
With respect to constitutional litigation, legal feminists like
Ginsburg were, in the early 1970s, primarily occupied with the task
of convincing judges that sex-based classifications were inherently
suspect, and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny. In the
Reed v. Reed “grandmother brief” and its progeny, they emphasized
the parallels between race and sex as categories of differentiation,
seeking to demonstrate that in most contexts, to make assumptions
about individuals based on such immutable characteristics was a
violation of basic principles of equality and fairness.20 Many saw
flaws in the race-sex analogy. Skeptics often contended that laws
differentiating between men and women favored the “fairer sex”
and were motivated by esteem and protective concern, rather than
the hostility, hatred, and attributions of inferiority that impelled
racial discrimination.21 Feminist lawyers spilled much ink in their
efforts to show that, in fact, laws that seemingly preferred women
effectively perpetuated damaging gender stereotypes and even
deprived women of benefits they had earned or could have earned
in nontraditional roles as wage earners.22 Revealing the pedestal’s
cagelike attributes was hard work, for the concept of sex discrimination did not come easily to many.
For that reason, feminist lawyers deliberately chose as their first
constitutional challenges cases that presented what they perceived
18. See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
1960-1972, at 233-54 (1990); Mary Becker, Essay, The Sixties Shift to
Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1998).
19. See Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 16. On the ERA campaign and the
amendment’s eventual failure, see generally MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986);
JANE DEHART & DONALD MATHEWS, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE ERA (1990);
JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986). The most comprehensive account of the
ERA’s projected effects at the time of congressional passage in 1971-72 is Barbara Brown et
al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871 (1971), known colloquially as the “Yale ERA article.”
20. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 20, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4),
1971 WL 133596.
21. Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 2, at 1049-51.
22. Id. at 1076-79.
OF NATIONAL POLICY
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to be particularly stark exclusions or disadvantages for women
—laws that were difficult to construe as protective or “benign” in
their effect on women. In the mid-1960s, Dorothy Kenyon and Pauli
Murray made their arguments for equality in jury service to federal
judges considering the legitimacy of a civil rights murder acquittal
by an all-white, all-male jury in an Alabama county where less than
20 percent of adults were white men.23 Alabama’s exclusion of
women from jury service was total,24 unlike many states where
women could opt into the jury pool voluntarily and were merely
“spared” the “burden” of serving. In the late 1960s, Marguerite
Rawalt and other National Organization for Women (NOW) lawyers
used Title VII to challenge protective laws that operated to exclude
women from jobs they wanted, rather than focusing on more
controversial minimum wage laws.25 The first case Ruth Bader
Ginsburg argued before the Supreme Court, Frontiero v. Richardson, was relatively clear cut in its detrimental effect on servicewomen whose husbands did not receive the same benefits as the
wives of their male counterparts.26 If judges could see the stark
unfairness of invidious discrimination in these instances, then the
stage would be set for the closer cases in which sex-differentiating
laws superficially appeared to be “benign.” The analogy to race
proved useful to legal feminists in the early 1970s because it recast
practices once viewed as chivalric concessions to women as
discrimination worthy of redress.

23. See White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 402, 404 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
24. Id. at 408-09. For more, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 131-36 (1998); Mayeri, Constitutional
Choices, supra note 16, at 779-84.
25. See, e.g., Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, 393 U.S. 83 (1968), vacated on
procedural grounds, 442 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. 411 U.S. 677, 677 (1973). For more on the Justices’ deliberations in Frontiero, see LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 57 (1998); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 221-26 (1990); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 65-82 (1988); Mayeri, A Common Fate,
supra note 2, at 1073-76; Fred Strebeigh, Standard Bearer, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003.
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B. “A Disgrace from Every Point of View”: The Kahn/DeFunis
Conundrum
As affirmative action became an increasingly controversial
political issue in the early 1970s, legal feminists could no longer
avoid confronting the complicated “benign” discrimination issue in
the litigation arena. To many feminists, opposition to sex-differentiating protective labor legislation on the one hand, and support for
affirmative action in employment and education on the other,
seemed perfectly compatible.27 After all, they believed, protective
laws were detrimental to women and to the cause of gender equality
because even when they did not overtly exclude women from certain
positions, such laws operated to perpetuate stereotypes that kept
women out of higher-paying, traditionally male jobs. Affirmative
action, on the other hand, was a form of differentiation designed to
bring women into nontraditional employment, explode outdated
notions about their natural proclivities and capacities, and combat
the very discriminatory assumptions on which protective laws were
based. Undoubtedly, to many it all seemed simple enough.
But as constitutional doctrine evolved, complicated legal and
strategic questions arose. If sex-based classifications inherently
raised judicial suspicion, and seemingly benign laws were often
unmasked as disguised discrimination, then how could judges tell
a “true” affirmative action policy from yet another oppressive
measure masquerading as a compensatory benefit? How could
feminist support for affirmative remediation be kept from under27. For examples of antiprotectionist and proremedial sentiments coexisting peacefully
and without comment, see generally Mary Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice:
Women’s Rights Under the Constitution, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 281 (1971); Robert A. Sedler, The
Legal Dimensions of Women’s Liberation: An Overview, 47 IND. L.J. 419 (1972). On feminist
efforts to promote the inclusion of women in affirmative action programs, see GRAHAM, supra
note 18, at 413; NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE 117-54 (2006); SKRENTNY, supra note 1, at 94-101.
Affirmative action was not yet a central concern for ERA proponents in the early 1970s,
for a variety of reasons. The Yale ERA article addressed the topic only briefly, and
affirmative action did not play a prominent role in the congressional debates over the ERA
in 1971-72. On the increasing centrality of affirmative action and related issues to the ERA
campaign, see Serena Mayeri, A New ERA or a New Era?: Amendment Advocacy and the
Reconstitution of Feminism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter
Mayeri, A New ERA]. On feminist efforts to include women in early affirmative action
programs, see GRAHAM, supra note 18; SKRENTNY, supra note 1.
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mining the women’s movement’s Fourteenth Amendment litigation
strategy and Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) advocacy? Conversely, how could the arguments feminists made to defeat laws
giving special “benefits” to women fail to discredit the case for
affirmative action for women, and even for racial minorities? As if
these analytic difficulties were not enough, legal and political
developments made them even more salient. Challenges to racebased remedies appeared alongside lawsuits attacking “benign” sex
classifications, forcing feminists to articulate not only the differences between programs that ameliorated injustice and those that
perpetuated inequality, but also the distinctions between race and
sex discrimination as social phenomena.
The latent potential conflict between efforts to expose “benign”
differentiation as pernicious discrimination on the one hand, and
feminist support for affirmative action on the other, reached a crisis
point in the 1973-74 Term, as two pertinent cases reached the
Supreme Court for oral argument virtually simultaneously. First in
the public consciousness was DeFunis v. Odegaard, the challenge
by Marco DeFunis, a Sephardic Jewish applicant rejected by the
University of Washington Law School, to that institution’s affirmative action policy.28 In the second case, Kahn v. Shevin, Mel Kahn,
a Florida widower, challenged a state law providing widows with a
small property tax exemption.29 Whereas the DeFunis case received
extensive media coverage, Kahn was little noticed outside the legal
community.30 Indeed, Kahn’s very progression to the Supreme
Court came as an unwelcome surprise to Ginsburg’s American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project (WRP); Kahn was
an inherently undesirable case because it did not involve the kind

28. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
29. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Though often characterized as a $500 property tax exemption,
the $500 referred to the value of property exempt from the tax. The actual tax savings was
approximately $15. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to James M. Klein, Harry W. Zanville,
and Stephen E. Klein, Civil Law Clinic, Univ. of Toledo Coll. of Law (May 28, 1974) (on file
with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 1, folder: Califano
v. Coffin: Correspondence, 1974).
30. See, e.g., Iver Peterson, DeFunis Decision May Bring Pressure To End Race as College
Admission Criterion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1974, at 20; Iver Peterson, Time To Decide If
Whites Are Victimized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1973, at 9; Warren Weaver, Law School’s Plan
To Aid Minorities Goes to High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1974, at 1.
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of “double-edged discrimination” Ginsburg liked to showcase.31
Unlike the policy challenged in Frontiero, which clearly disadvantaged both women and men, the damage visited upon women by
Florida’s statute was considerably more attenuated. Denying
benefits to the dependent spouses of servicewomen degraded
women’s breadwinning capacity in addition to presupposing a
traditional gender role division, while depriving widowers of a
property tax exemption did not as directly impinge upon women’s
ability to provide for their husbands.
Still, once the case reached the high Court, the WRP could do
little but make the best of the situation: after all, a longstanding
statute presuming that widows were more likely to be in need of
financial assistance than widowers did perpetuate sex stereotypes,
and feminists did not believe the miniscule exemption truly was
intended to eliminate economic inequality between the sexes. Even
so, Ginsburg hoped for a reprieve until the end, declaring to a
friend, “I’ll give you a gold medal if you can suggest any route other
than equal protection for widower Kahn.”32 Noting the Court’s
apparent inclination toward an intermediate standard of scrutiny
for certain equal protection challenges, Ginsburg suggested to her
colleagues that Kahn was not the case on which to stake the WRP’s
fight for strict scrutiny.33 Indeed, by Ginsburg’s own account, the
brief “trie[d] to fudge on the review standard issue.”34 The fewer
precedents set by Kahn, the better, she reasoned.
Compounding Ginsburg’s dismay over Kahn’s inopportune path
to the Supreme Court was its unfortunate juxtaposition with
31. Memorandum from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Marc [Fasteau], Brenda [Feigen
Fasteau], and Christine [Cassaday Curtis] (Nov. 13, 1973) [hereinafter Ginsburg-Fasteau
Memorandum] (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers,
container 4, folder: Kahn v. Shevin: Correspondence, 1973-75) (“I don’t think we should do
a number on sex as suspect—since we don’t have double-edged discrimination.”).
32. Memorandum from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Mary McGowan Davis (Jan. 30, 1974)
(on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 4, folder:
Kahn v. Shevin: Correspondence, 1973-75) [hereinafter Ginsburg-Davis Memorandum].
Ginsburg had hoped to bring Wiesenfeld as the next WRP case after Frontiero. Letter from
Ruth Bader Ginsburg to John H. Fleming, Robert L. Deitz, and Allan B. Taylor, Harvard
Law Review (Dec. 16, 1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, container 4, folder: Kahn v. Shevin: Correspondence, 1973-75).
33. Ginsburg-Fasteau Memorandum, supra note 31.
34. Ginsburg-Davis Memorandum, supra note 32.

2008]

RECONSTRUCTING THE RACE-SEX ANALOGY

1803

DeFunis, argued the same week.35 DeFunis, she feared, would lead
the Justices to see Florida’s property tax exemption as a permissible remedial measure analogous to affirmative action. The race-sex
analogy the WRP lawyers had promoted so assiduously in Reed
and Frontiero now haunted their advocacy in Kahn; as Ginsburg
later observed, her challenge in Kahn was “get[ting] the Court to
understand they couldn’t lump sex and race together; that there
were differences.”36 Conversely, Kahn had the potential to undermine arguments for “true” affirmative action; if Mel Kahn’s lawyers
proved too much, the Court might conclude that all distinctions

35. The parallels between the two cases were self-evident, at least to Justices Brennan
and Blackmun’s clerks. See Memorandum from T[homas] M[.] J[orde], law clerk, to Justice
William J. Brennan, Re: Kahn v. Shevin [undated] (on file with the Library of Congress in
William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I: 325, folder 12) (“There are problems here similar to
those raised in the Washington Law School case, e.g., what efforts may a State take to
correct past imbalances which were based upon suspect classification distinctions; in the
Washington Law School the classification is race; here it is sex.”); Bench Memorandum from
[Robert I.] Richter, law clerk, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: No. 73-78, Kahn v. Shevin
2 (Feb. 16, 1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 185,
folder 6) (“The issue is closely tied with the one presented in Defunis v. Odegaard which will
be argued the following day ....”).
Richter wrote:
The first way to distinguish [Kahn from cases like DeFunis] is that in a case
like Defunis there is a direct state interest in training black lawyeres [sic]. The
widow provision here is aimed at helping needy people, not women and
presumably the state’s interest would be better served by limiting the
exemption to the needy. There is no alternative to the explicit benign racial
quota in Defunis that will serve the same interest. A second distinction is that
racial cases can always be viewed as providng [sic] compensatory-type
treatment to cure the pervasive discrimination of the past and that there is
always a state interest in training black lawyers to assist in this task. It is
difficult to view the provision at issue here as designed to overcome past
discrimination although I imagine the argument could be made. Finally, there
is the fact that race is suspect and for the moment sex isn’t. While this would
seem to cut in favor of Mr. Defunis and against Mr. Kahn, this would not
necessarily be true if benign classifications were treated differently than
invidious ones. (Which is how I think Defunis should be resolved). In short, it
will be possible to reach any combination or permutation of results in this case
and Defunis and be able to write consistent opinions or take consistent
positions. It will however, have to be a conscious process.
Id. at 7-8.
36. Ruth B. Cowan, Women’s Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American
Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 373,
393 (1976) (alteration in original).
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based on sex—or race—were impermissible, even if intended to
combat proven patterns of discrimination.
The WRP’s briefs in Kahn attempted to walk this fine line by
helping the Justices distinguish between laws targeted to alleviate
discrimination and policies based on outdated gender stereotypes.
At times, the appellant’s opening brief sounded as if no sex-based
distinction would escape the discriminatory label: “Both discrimination against, and special benefits for, women stem from stereotypical notions about their proper role in society,”37 read one sentence.
At another point, the brief declared that “lump treatment of men,
on the one hand, and women on the other is constitutionally
impermissible.”38 In other places, however, the WRP was careful not
to close the door on legitimate remedial measures, distinguishing
Florida’s property tax exemption from a Social Security calculation
favoring women that was upheld by the Second Circuit several
years earlier in Gruenwald v. Gardner.39 A footnote clarified
further:
Generalized provisions based on gender stereotypes of the
variety here at issue must be distinguished from affirmative
action measures tailored narrowly and specifically to rectify the
effects of past discrimination against women in a particular
setting. Such measures deal directly with economic and social
conditions that underlie and support a subordinate status for
women.40

Not surprisingly, the State of Florida seized on remedial justifications in defending the tax exemption; the challenged statute
was, they implied, tantamount to an affirmative action measure.41
Ironically, the WRP found itself on the receiving end of a lecture
about women’s unequal economic status and prospects: “Although
37. Brief for Appellants at 4, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (No. 73-78), 1973 WL
172384.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id. at 24 (“[T]he distinction approved in Gruenwald [v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.
1968)] had at least a tenuous relationship to discrimination encountered by women in the
labor market ... [whereas the Florida tax exemption was] not tied in any way to
discrimination encountered by women in economic activity.”).
40. Id. at 24 n.19.
41. Brief for Appellees at 3, Kahn, 416 U.S. 351 (No. 73-78), 1974 WL 185605.
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women make up an ever-increasing portion of the work force, they
are still far behind in obtaining equality of economic opportunity,”42
Florida’s lawyers argued, accusing the plaintiff of downplaying
women’s economic disadvantages.43 In their reply brief, Kahn’s
lawyers reiterated “the critical distinction between lump treatment
of women as the inferior and therefore needier sex, and measures
designed to undo the inequalities in economic opportunity women
encounter,” including “laws prohibiting gender discrimination in
education, employment, financing, housing, and public accommodations.”44 In the wake of this exchange, Ginsburg was eager to
address the Kahn/DeFunis distinction in oral argument, and she
had a golden opportunity when Justice Harry Blackmun asked her
to do just that during her rebuttal: “Since I had carefully prepared
an answer to that question, I was delighted with the opportunity to
hammer down the distinction,” Ginsburg related to Kahn’s original
attorney, Bill Hoppe.45 She was optimistic about the Court’s likely
response to her presentation, remarking magnanimously that she
thought the Justices had been “unnecessarily severe” in questioning
her opponent.46
When the Court issued its decisions in Kahn and DeFunis on
consecutive days in April 1974, however, Ginsburg was sorely
disappointed. In what seemed like a startling reversal of his
position in Frontiero, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the
majority in Kahn that the widows’ tax exemption rested upon a
desire to compensate women for the economic disadvantages they
suffered, particularly after losing a spouse.47 He distinguished the
policy challenged in Frontiero as hurting rather than helping
women, noting that “[g]ender has never been rejected as an
impermissible classification in all instances,” and, perhaps most
42. Id.
43. Id. at 9-10 (“Appellant, in arguing that women are not in such an economically
inferior position, emphasizes heavily that women have been increasing as a percentage of the
work force. He chooses to ignore the fact that this has not benefited women in regard to
earning capacity .... The gap, in fact, was greater in 1970 than it was in 1955.” (citation
omitted)).
44. Reply Brief for Appellants at 3-4, Kahn, 416 U.S. 351 (No. 73-78), 1974 WL 185606.
45. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Bill Hoppe, Law Offices of Colson & Hicks (Mar.
8, 1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 4,
folder: Kahn v. Shevin: Correspondence, 1973-75).
46. Id.
47. Kahn, 416 U.S at 355.
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jarring to feminists, citing the original “Brandeis brief” in Muller v.
Oregon as “emphasiz[ing] that the special physical structure of
women has a bearing on the ‘conditions under which she should be
permitted to toil.’”48 A dissent authored by Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. and joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall agreed that
laws designed to ameliorate economic discrimination against
women were permissible and necessary, but contended that
Florida’s law did not meet the narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny—a standard that Justice Douglas apparently abandoned
after lending his endorsement in Frontiero.49
Only Justice Byron White’s opinion satisfied Ginsburg; in a pithy
dissent, White criticized the presumption that all widows were
more economically disadvantaged than all widowers as resting upon
the stereotype that all widows “have been occupied as housewife,
mother, and homemaker and are not immediately prepared for
employment.”50 Nor was the remedial justification a “credible
explanation,” White reasoned, given the over- and under-inclusiveness of the exemption.51 To Ginsburg, White was “the only one with
complete integrity,” though she had “some sympathy with Brennan
and Marshall in their effort to avoid conflict with their probable
position in DeFunis.”52 The position of those Justices in DeFunis
remained no more than probable, as the Court dismissed the case
as moot, failing to reach a decision on the merits. Douglas, however,
dissented from the finding of mootness, arguing both for the
importance of resolving the affirmative action question in general,
and against the University of Washington Law School’s affirmative
action program in particular.53 Race, he concluded, was not a
permissible criterion for differentiating between applicants for
university admission.54

48. Id. at 356 n.10 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 359-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 361-62.
52. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Sara-Ann Determan, Hogan & Hartson (Apr. 26,
1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 4,
folder: Kahn v. Shevin: Correspondence, 1973-75) [hereinafter Apr. 26 Ginsburg-Determan
Letter].
53. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 344.
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Douglas’s opinion in Kahn, Ginsburg wrote, was “a disgrace from
every point of view.”55 In Ginsburg’s view, Douglas had betrayed
his vote in Frontiero for strict scrutiny by joining the “deplorable”
Kahn majority position, and had compounded his error by reaching
the opposite conclusion in his DeFunis dissent.56 “It is galling,”
Ginsburg wrote to a fellow lawyer,
that Douglas sees women as appropriate objects of benign
dispensation (ranked with the blind and the totally disabled)
when he should know that there is no surer way to keep them
down than to perpetuate that brand of chivalry. His DeFunis
dissent indicates he would regard such a “favor” for blacks
(where the same earnings gap can be demonstrated) as “invidious.”57

In the end, Ginsburg’s initial assessment seemed correct: Kahn was
“the wrong case brought to the Court at the wrong time.”58 DeFunis,
on the other hand, “hit[] a sensitive nerve,” as Ginsburg wrote
55. Apr. 26 Ginsburg-Determan Letter, supra note 52.
56. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Stephanie W. Kanwit, Reg’l Dir., Fed. Trade
Comm’n (Apr. 30, 1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers,
container 12, folder: Speech File, Apr.-May 1974) [hereinafter Ginsburg-Kanwit Letter]; see
also Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Sara-Ann Determan, Hogan & Hartson (Apr. 30,
1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 4,
folder: Kahn v. Shevin: Correspondence, 1973-75) [hereinafter Apr. 30 Ginsburg-Determan
Letter].
57. Id. Ginsburg was hardly the Court’s only severe critic; in a comprehensive analysis
of four Supreme Court Terms, John D. Johnston, Jr., noted that, although “[i]t would have
been quite easy ... to reconcile a vote to invalidate the Kahn statute with a vote to uphold the
admissions policy challenged in DeFunis,” the Court had blundered in Kahn and dodged in
DeFunis. John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court: 1971-1974, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 664 (1974).
Even those who disagreed with Ginsburg and Johnston on the merits of Kahn noticed the
inconsistency: Justice Powell’s clerk, Jack Owens, wrote to Powell on an early draft of
Douglas’s majority opinion: “Unbelievable. Join. Pin him down while you’ve got the chance.”
First Draft of Douglas Opinion in Kahn (circulated Mar. 12, 1974) (on file with the
Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court
Case Files, Powell Archives, 73-78 Kahn v. Shevin). Justice Blackmun’s clerk, Robert I.
Richter, noted that Douglas’s opinion in Kahn was “wholly inconsistent with Justice Douglas’
own view that sex is suspect and that reverse discrimination is impermissible (Defunis) but
I guess that is his problem.” Memorandum from Robert I. Richter, law clerk, to Justice Harry
A. Blackmun, Re: No. 73-78 Kahn v. Shevin, Circulation by Justice Douglas (Mar. 12, 1974)
(on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 185, folder 6).
58. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21.
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shortly after the Court’s dismissal of the case.59 “It demonstrates
why sex discrimination can’t be lumped together with discrimination against historically disadvantaged minority groups.”60
C. “Exceedingly Difficult To Talk About Equality of Treatment”:
Pregnancy and the Limitations of Reasoning from Race
The Kahn/DeFunis debacle was followed shortly by the Court’s
decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,61 a disaster of much greater magnitude for legal feminists. In that case, female plaintiffs, on behalf of
themselves and similarly situated women, challenged a California
Unemployment Insurance Code provision exempting pregnancyrelated work loss from coverage of the state’s disability insurance
program until twenty-eight days after the pregnancy’s end.62
Carolyn Aiello, a self-supporting hairdresser, had interrupted her
employment to receive treatment for an ectopic pregnancy.63
Augustina Armendariz, the sole financial provider for herself, her
husband, and her infant son, suffered a miscarriage and was
ordered by her doctors to cease her work as a secretary for several
weeks in order to recover.64 Jacquelyn Jaramillo, who experienced
a normal pregnancy and delivery, also supported her family while
her husband finished school; she sought benefits for the period in
which she was physically incapacitated as a result of childbirth.65
In May 1973, a three-judge district court sitting in the Northern
District of California ruled, 2-1, that the state’s disability benefit
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause.66 Acknowledging that
Frontiero had left the appropriate standard of review for sex-based
classifications ambiguous, Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli, a Kennedy
59. Apr. 30 Ginsburg-Determan Letter, supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
62. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1953) (amended 1979) (“‘Disability’ or ‘disabled’
includes both mental or physical illness and mental or physical injury. An individual shall
be deemed disabled in any day in which, because of his physical or mental condition, he is
unable to perform his regular or customary work. In no case shall the term ‘disability’ or
‘disabled’ include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up
to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.”).
63. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 794-95 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
64. Id. at 795.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 801.
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appointee, wrote for himself and Ninth Circuit Judge Ben C.
Duniway that under the framework established in Reed,67 pregnant
women must be treated as individuals, not as a group that would
inevitably make large and unwieldy insurance claims.68 Quoting a
recent federal case from Ohio that struck down a mandatory
maternity leave provision, Judge Zirpoli wrote: “Sexual stereotypes
are no less invidious than racial or religious ones. Any rule by an
employer that seeks to deal with all pregnant employees in an
identical fashion is dehumanizing to the individual women involved
and is by its very nature arbitrary and discriminatory.”69 The court
opined that “the denial of benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities
seems to have its roots in the belief that all pregnant women are
incapable of work for long periods of time, and therefore, they will
submit large disability claims.”70 If the state wished to limit the
size of insurance claims, Judge Zirpoli maintained, the equal
protection guarantee required that it do so directly, rather than
using pregnancy as a proxy for large expenditures.71 Judge Spencer
Williams, recently appointed to the bench by President Nixon,
dissented, noting that “it is exceedingly difficult to talk about
equality of treatment between the sexes when pregnancy is involved.”72
A majority of Supreme Court Justices shared this difficulty. In
Geduldig, Justice Potter Stewart rejected the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim, concluding that, “[w]hile it is true that only
women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification
like those considered in Reed and Frontiero.”73 The insurance
program, Stewart noted, “divides potential recipients into two
groups— pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While the
first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of

67. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Iowa probate statute as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause).
68. Aiello, 359 F. Supp. at 798.
69. Id. (quoting Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D. Ohio
1972)).
70. Id. at 799.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 806 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
73. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
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both sexes.”74 In effect, because men could not give birth, and
women did not necessarily become pregnant, discrimination based
on pregnancy did not constitute discrimination based on sex. “There
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men
are not.”75 California’s disability scheme therefore was subject to
the least stringent level of review, rational basis analysis, applicable to social welfare provisions generally.
Justice Brennan dissented vehemently from this view, in an
opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas. Brennan would
have analyzed the disability program under the more stringent
standard of review developed in Reed and Frontiero. He wrote:
In my view, by singling out for less favorable treatment a
gender-linked disability peculiar to women, the State has
created a double standard for disability compensation: a
limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women
workers may recover, while men receive full compensation for
all disabilities suffered, including those that affect only or
primarily their sex .... In effect, one set of rules is applied to
females and another to males. Such dissimilar treatment of men
and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably
linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.76

Brennan’s objection to the exclusion of pregnancy from California’s
disability scheme differed from Zirpoli’s. Whereas Zirpoli defined
the primary harm as the violation of a woman’s right to be treated
as an individual rather than stereotyped as severely disabled by
pregnancy, Brennan emphasized how the law treated women as a
group differently from men. Both men, though, accepted feminists’
view that to treat pregnancy as something other than a temporary
disability similar to other temporary disabilities was to violate the
equal protection guarantee.77
To the Court’s majority, in contrast, classifications based on
pregnancy seemed logical: pregnancy, after all, did not happen to
men, so male and female workers were not similarly situated, a
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 500-04; Aiello, 359 F. Supp. at 797-99.
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common prerequisite for equal protection analysis. Significantly,
pregnancy discrimination appeared to have no clear racial analogue; rather, it was a product of “real” sex differences with a
biological basis that racial distinctions lacked.78 Further, the class
of persons who become pregnant and the category of women were
not coterminous; accordingly, the Court was able to distinguish the
disadvantages of pregnancy from sex-based inequality.79 If the
Kahn/DeFunis dilemma demonstrated the perils of analogy,
Geduldig was an even more poignant, albeit more subtle, illustration of its limits. When discrimination against women did not
resemble the prevailing paradigm of racial injustice, many judges
had difficulty recognizing constitutional harm.80
II. REFRAMING THE RACE-SEX ANALOGY
In the wake of the confusion elicited by the juxtaposition of Kahn
and DeFunis and the failure of the civil rights paradigm to capture
the harm of pregnancy discrimination, Ruth Bader Ginsburg articulated a theory of the relationship between race, gender, and
affirmative action that she would reiterate, elaborate on, and refine
in the coming years. Distinctions between race and sex inequality
78. The parties in Geduldig did not make explicit analogical arguments, though at least
two amicus briefs pointed out that a policy denying disability benefits to sickle-cell anemia
sufferers would clearly constitute invidious racial discrimination. Brief for The Physicians
Forum as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640),
1974 WL 185747; Brief for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7-8, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640), 1974
WL 185756.
79. The Court reasoned that, “[w]hile it is true that only women can become pregnant it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification .... Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics.” Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. After the Court subsequently found
Title VII inapplicable to pregnancy-based discrimination in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), Congress responded by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 192 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
80. At least under the Equal Protection Clause; the Court was more responsive to the
constitutional claims of pregnant women when they could be framed as due process
violations. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating public
school district’s mandatory maternity leave policy under Due Process Clause). The LaFleur
case, as well as its companion case Cohen v. Chesterfield County Board of Education, had
been argued under the Equal Protection Clause as well, but the Court did not take up this
analysis. For more on the consequences of this choice, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE,
supra note 2.
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became, for Ginsburg, a context for thinking more broadly about
structural changes to the workplace and to the distribution of
caretaking and wage-earning responsibilities within the family.
Once the Court had firmly established a distinction between detrimental classifications and genuine affirmative action, Ginsburg
also hoped to extend the Supreme Court’s more expansive view of
permissible remedies for sex inequality to increasingly embattled
race-based affirmative action programs. For Ginsburg and her
allies, the race-sex analogy became, potentially, a flexible tool that
permitted dis-analogy to serve as an opportunity for rethinking
both race- and sex-based remedies.
A. “The Home-Work Gap Must Be Confronted”: Affirmative Action
and Family Roles
Potentially redeeming the 1974 Supreme Court Term for legal
feminists was the WRP’s victory in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in
which Stephen Wiesenfeld successfully challenged a Social Security
provision awarding lesser death benefits to widowers than to
widows.81 The plaintiff lost his wife, a schoolteacher who earned
substantially more than her husband, in childbirth. After her death,
he had trouble finding adequate child care and felt compelled to
reduce his own work hours to care for their son, Jason.82 The
Wiesenfeld case highlighted not only discrimination against female
wage earners, but also against men who served as family caregivers; it was, as Ginsburg later recalled, her ideal case, because
the facts allowed the WRP “to cast men in the role of being good
parents. The theme was that children will grow up happier and
better all around if they have the care of two loving parents, rather
than just one.”83
A majority of the Justices agreed on both counts. Justice
Brennan, who had failed to garner majority support for the race-sex
analogy in Frontiero, persevered in his quest for Court consensus
that sex discrimination was an evil comparable to race discrimination and an affront to women’s contributions to their families’
81. 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (plurality opinion).
82. Id. at 641 n.7.
83. An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1038
(2004).
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financial well-being. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
acknowledged that “[o]bviously, the notion that men are more
likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses
and children is not entirely without empirical support. But,” he
emphasized, “such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to
justify the denigration ... of women who do work and whose
earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.”84
Significantly, the opinion also stressed the difficulties that Stephen
Wiesenfeld would have faced as a parent caring for his children
alone, regardless of whether he had been dependent upon his wife’s
income: “It is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole
surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female,”
Brennan wrote, and “to the extent that women who work when they
have sole responsibility for children encounter special problems, it
would seem that men with sole responsibility for children will
encounter the same child-care related problems.”85
Justice Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, accepted the first premise but did not wholly
embrace the second. Powell agreed that the “statutory scheme ...
impermissibly discriminates against a female wage earner because
it provides her family less protection than it provides that of a male
wage earner, even though the family needs may be identical.”86
Powell “attach[ed] less significance” than the plurality, though, to
fathers’ rights to care for their children: “In light of the long
experience to the contrary, one may doubt that fathers generally
will forgo work and remain at home to care for children to the same
extent that mothers may make this choice.”87 Privately, Powell
disapproved of fathers who would order their lives this way. When
his law clerk, Julia “Penny” Clark, speculated that the subset of
fathers who would choose to remain at home with their children
was “a small class, no doubt,” Powell wrote in the margin of her
memo, “I would hope so—though the ever-increasing welfare rolls
even in prosperous times suggest a high level of indolence.”88
84. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 652.
86. Id. at 654-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 655 n.*. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result without reaching the sex
discrimination question. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result).
88. Memorandum from Julia “Penny” Clark, law clerk, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3
(Jan. 17, 1975) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F.
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It is perhaps unsurprising that a man of Justice Powell’s
background would have been unable to conceive of a responsible
father who wished to stay home and care for his child. As Powell
biographer John C. Jeffries, Jr. describes, “Powell’s family and upbringing had been conventionally male-dominated.... The devotion
of women to home and hearth seemed as fixed and right and
natural as the seasons.”89 Powell had written to his daughter Jo in
1942, “You should be prepared to do some job in the world, because
all women will work more from now on, but your ultimate career,
I hope, will be making a home. I am old fashion[ed] enough to
believe still that this is woman’s highest calling.”90
By 1975, Powell had hired his first female law clerk—Penny
Clark—who recalled later that before choosing her over a similarly
qualified male, the Justice consulted the appellate judge for whom
Clark had worked to make sure she was not “the kind of girl who’s
going to break down in tears when the going gets tough.”91 Still,
Powell was a gentleman in both manner and deed: to a person, his
female law clerks, including the feminist scholars Mary Becker and
Christina Brooks Whitman, remember him as unfailingly courteous
and respectful of their intellectual abilities.92 His chivalric gestures
bespoke kindness and civility rather than contempt or condescension; as Whitman told Jeffries years later, “He really took me
seriously and listened to what I had to say.... Yes, he was paternal,
and he had no idea of the things that were going on in my life, but
he trusted what I had to say.”93 In Wiesenfeld, Powell accepted
Penny Clark’s recommendation that the challenged statute be
invalidated, but stopped short of agreeing with her statement that
“unless it is rational for society to insist that men work rather
than care for children, there is no rational basis for the gender
classification in the existing statutory scheme.”94 Powell’s margina-

Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 73-1892 Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld) [hereinafter Clark-Powell Memorandum].
89. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 502 (1994).
90. Id. (alteration in original).
91. Id. at 503.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 508.
94. Clark-Powell Memorandum, supra note 88.
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lia revealed his ambivalence: “This [classification] may have some
rationality.”95
Despite Powell’s concurring qualification—it was a “close and
difficult case for [him]”96—Wiesenfeld was unquestionably a
triumph for legal feminists. Initially, the case had struck some of
the Justices and their law clerks as a fairly straightforward
application of the Kahn principle. The “cert pool memo,” in which
a clerk summarizes the case in order to help the Justices decide
whether to hear it, recommended summarily reversing the lower
court’s invalidation of the distinction in light of Kahn.97 Richard
Blumenthal, Justice Blackmun’s clerk assigned to Wiesenfeld,
acknowledged that the case was “not quite so easy as the cert. pool
memo implies,” but still called it “a comparatively easy case” and
counseled reversal.98 “Working women, to be sure, are disadvantaged by the provision,” Blumenthal admitted, “[b]ut if the Kahn
statistics [on wage-earning disparities] are still valid ... the
differential treatment would seem to have a fair and substantial
relationship to the object of the legislation,” because “widows with
children are far more likely to need such benefits than widowers.”99
Blackmun’s initial inclination was also to reverse, as were Burger’s
and William H. Rehnquist’s.100 In the end, though, the Court
unanimously voted to invalidate the sex-based distinction, perhaps
a testament to the persuasive powers of Justice Brennan and
attorney Ginsburg.
Notwithstanding the Wiesenfeld victory, feminist defeats in Kahn
and Geduldig and the failure of the Court to articulate a consistent
95. Id.
96. Conference Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Jan. 22, 1975) (on file with the Washington
and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files,
Powell Archives, 73-1892 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld) [hereinafter Powell Conference Notes].
97. O’Neill, Preliminary Memorandum on 73-1892, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 3 (July 19,
1979) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 73-1892 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld)
(“Only a very narrow reading of Kahn, accepting the petr’s [sic] distinction, and an unnatural
focus on the deceased wage earner rather than the actual beneficiary can save the appellee’s
case. The case should be reversed in light of Kahn, probably summarily.”).
98. Bench Memorandum from Richard Blumenthal, law clerk, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, Re: Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, No. 73-1892, at 4 (Dec. 23, 1974) (on file with the
Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 203, folder 6).
99. Id. at 6.
100. See Powell Conference Notes, supra note 96.
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standard of review for sex-based classifications rendered the future
of sex equality law uncertain. These mixed results placed constitutional law at a critical juncture at which, among other things, the
relationship between race and sex discrimination’s harms and
remedies were in question. Ginsburg stepped into the breach,
articulating a comprehensive theory of race- and sex-based harm
and remediation in her 1975 article, Gender and the Constitution.101
Ginsburg’s synthesis of developments in constitutional sex equality
law concluded with a section entitled Realizing the Equality
Principle, in which she laid out her vision of appropriate remediation.102
Ginsburg began by noting that “[a]s in the case of discrimination
against racial and ethnic minorities, the ultimate goal with respect
to sex-based discrimination should be a system of genuine neutrality.”103 But, she wrote, altering “deeply entrenched discriminatory
patterns ... entails recognition that generators of race and sex
discrimination are often different. Neither ghettoized minorities nor
women are well served by lumping their problems in the economic
sector together for all purposes.”104 For one thing, Ginsburg noted,
nonminority women did not suffer the same economic isolation as
racial minorities, so that in the realm of education, remedies for
sex discrimination might take the form of “altering recruitment
patterns and eliminating institutional practices that limit or discourage female participation,” rather than giving special consideration to women in admission to colleges and universities.105 At the
same time, there were important similarities between race and sex
discrimination in the context of employment, such that affirmative
action in training, hiring, and promotion—including numerical
remedies—was appropriate for women as well as people of color.106
But the race-sex parallel went only so far, even in the employment context. Ginsburg identified “[c]ustomary responsibility for
household management” as “the most stubborn obstacle to equal

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
See id. at 27-40.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 32-33.
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opportunity for women.”107 She declared that “above all else, the
home-work gap must be confronted.”108 She wrote:
Care of young children, particularly, poses formidable psychological and logistical barriers for women who pursue and seek
advancement in gainful employment. Solutions to the homework problem are as easily stated as they are hard to realize:
man must join woman at the center of family life, and government must step in to assist both of them during the years when
they have small children.109

To that end, Ginsburg argued that not only must pregnancy
discrimination be eradicated—under Title VII and/or the ERA, now
that the Equal Protection Clause was unavailable—but that the
government and employers should also provide job and income
security for childbearing workers and quality child care options for
working men and women of all income levels.110 Only then,
Ginsburg insisted, would true equal opportunity for women be
realized.
Ginsburg’s calls for universal child care and for job security for
pregnant workers were nothing new, of course.111 But importantly,
she articulated such policies as necessary to an effective affirmative
action agenda—one that built upon remedies developed in the race
context, but recognized the unique dimensions of sex inequality.
Race and sex discrimination were not identical, she acknowledged,
but their differences should inspire more expansive and creative
solutions rather than hampering the recognition and remediation
of harm.

107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 38.
111. For more on feminist efforts to obtain universal child care, see Deborah Dinner,
Transforming Family and State: Women’s Vision for Universal Child Care, 1966-1971
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
582001.
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B. “I Could Not Have Done Better”: The Promise of Reverse
Analogy
So long as the status of “benign” sex discrimination was unsettled, Ginsburg remained wary of the race-sex analogy’s impact on
both sex and race equality jurisprudence. But the Court’s synthesis
of its sex equality decisions in the 1977 case Califano v. Webster112
renewed the analogy’s appeal by providing a coherent—if somewhat
cryptic—articulation of the difference between classifications based
on invidious stereotypes and genuine remedial measures. This time,
though, the analogy’s promise ran in reverse: race-based affirmative
action policies, now under fire in an increasingly conservative
political climate, stood to reap benefits from a parallel with sex
classifications.
Before Webster acknowledged a distinction between harmful
stereotyping and helpful remediation, Ginsburg was inclined to
avoid the question of “benign discrimination,” or laws that disadvantaged men, in cases where she sought to overturn sex-based
classifications that she believed to be relics of a discriminatory past.
In Craig v. Boren, an uninspiring case about near-beer that reached
the Supreme Court despite the WRP’s best-laid plans, the Court
established intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for
sex-based classifications.113 This middle-tier level of review,
requiring that sex-based distinctions be “substantially related” to
“important governmental objectives,”114 was a compromise between
the remaining Justices from the Frontiero plurality—Brennan,
Marshall, and White—who favored strict scrutiny, and those
112. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
113. 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976). Powell clerk Christina Brooks Whitman expressed the views
of many when she called Craig “a silly case on which to make sex discrimination law.”
Handwritten Notes of Christina Brooks Whitman, law clerk, on Preliminary Memorandum
on 75-628 Craig v. Boren 1 (Jan. 9, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University
School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives,
75-628 Craig v. Boren); see also “Aid to Memory” Memorandum of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (July
9, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-628 Craig v. Boren) (“This is the
silly case from Oklahoma ....”); Bench Memorandum from Tyler Baker, law clerk, to Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Aug. 16, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School
of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-628
Craig v. Boren) (“The fate of the nation does not hinge on the resolution of this case.”).
114. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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Justices who remained wary of what they perceived to be a drastic
and undemocratic step—Blackmun, Powell, and Potter Stewart.115
Justice Brennan, perhaps sensing his colleagues’ increasing concern
that the Court had overstepped its role by applying heightened
scrutiny to sex-based classifications, used Craig to consolidate what
gains he could in a standard that stopped short of making sex a
“suspect” classification, while still specifying that a mere rational
basis no longer sufficed to justify sex-based legal distinctions.116

115. See id. at 191; see also id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring) (elaborating on the
Court’s “difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be
applied consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications”).
116. Justice Powell did not approve of such an explicitly articulated new test for sex
classifications. Powell wrote a concurrence in Craig agreeing that the challenged statute
lacked a rational basis but expressing concern about the intermediate scrutiny standard. Id.
at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell’s clerk, Tyler Baker, expressed disappointment that
“Justice Brennan did not write this opinion as narrowly as it deserved to be written.” Baker
“suppose[d] [Brennan] was following the old adage that you make hay while the sun is
shining.” Memorandum from Tyler Baker, law clerk, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 2 (Nov.
2, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-628 Craig v. Boren). Chief Justice
Burger was more chagrined, writing to Brennan, “I advised you when I asked you to take
over assignment, that I might wind up joining you if the opinion was narrowly written.
However, you read into Reed v. Reed what is not there.... As written, I cannot possibly join.”
Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Nov. 15,
1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-628 Craig v. Boren).
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, had hoped the Court would settle on a “middle tier”
level of scrutiny as early as 1974, in Kahn v. Shevin. See Harry A. Blackmun, No. 7378—Kahn v. Shevin 2 (Feb. 18, 1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, box 185, folder 6) (“I am hoping that somewhere out of this session we can
come up with a middle tier approach.”). In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Blackmun
wrote an opinion for the Court striking down a state law requiring parents to support their
sons until age twenty-one, but their daughters only until age eighteen, using a rational basis
standard. When Stanton was under consideration, Blackmun’s law clerk, David “Allan”
Gates, declared his personal ambivalence about making sex a suspect classification, but
nevertheless saw no rational basis for the challenged classification and recommended that
it be invalidated. See Bench Memorandum from David Allan Gates, law clerk, to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Stanton v. Stanton, No. 73-1461, at 14-16 (Feb. 6, 1975) (on file with
the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 201, folder 1); see also Harry A.
Blackmun, No. 73-1461—Stanton v. Stanton 4-5 (Feb. 10, 1975) (on file with the Library of
Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 201, folder 1) (“Allan properly suggests that the
decision should be narrow .... If ... we go on to the merits, then I am inclined to agree that we
have some kind of violation of equal protection here. I would not want to do this on a
compelling state interest approach or a suspect classification concept but just because there
is no rationality whatsoever in the distinction.”).
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In the wake of Craig, Ginsburg hoped to lead the Justices further
away from Kahn, and to continue the progress achieved in
Wiesenfeld. Califano v. Goldfarb, a challenge to another Social
Security provision that afforded survivors’ benefits to all widows
regardless of dependency, but only to widowers who had received at
least one-half of their financial support from their wives, was next
on the WRP’s docket.117 For the Court’s crucial center, Goldfarb was
a very close case: Justice Powell initially thought Frontiero and
Wiesenfeld controlled the outcome, then had second thoughts and
requested further analysis from his clerk,118 who found himself in
a “quandary.”119 Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens all
expressed concern in conference that the Court had “gone too far”
in sex discrimination cases, “intrud[ing] on [the] legislative function,” but they also recognized the power of these precedents.120
Meanwhile, although Ginsburg had been eager to discuss the
differences between supposedly “benign” discrimination that actually harmed women and legitimate affirmative action measures
when she had argued Kahn in the shadow of DeFunis three years
earlier, by the time she stood before the Supreme Court to argue
Goldfarb she hoped to dodge the issue altogether. “With preferential program issues in the wings (like the California Bakke case) I
tried to avoid treading on that territory,” Ginsburg explained a few
117. 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977).
118. “Aid to Memory” Memorandum of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 4-5 (Aug. 2, 1976) (on file with
the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme
Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb) [hereinafter Powell “Aid to
Memory” Memorandum] (“At the time we noted this case, I thought it rather clear that this
gender-based classification was invalid under Wiesenfeld and Frontiero. Having now scanned
the briefs, and reflected further on the issue, I am no longer confident that my initial view
is correct.... I would like for my clerk to present both sides of this issue as strongly as possible
in light of our prior decisions.”).
119. Memorandum from Tyler Baker, law clerk, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 14 (Aug.
12, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699 Matthews v. Goldfarb) (“I
think that this case presents a real quandry [sic].”).
120. Conference Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Oct. 8, 1976) (on file with the Washington
and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files,
Powell Archives, 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb); Docket Sheet, No. 75-699—Mathews v.
Goldfarb (on file with the Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I: 401,
folder 7); see also Harry A. Blackmun, No. 75-699—Mathews v. Goldfarb (Sept. 27, 1976) (on
file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 241, folder 5) (“My basic
philosophy in this general area is to leave this kind of thing to Congress.”).
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days after the oral argument.121 But Justice Stevens had been
bound and determined to ask her whether laws discriminating
against men without harming women should be judged by the same
standard as those that disadvantaged women directly; indeed, he
rephrased the question at least twice before Ginsburg replied
noncommittally that she would “withhold judgment” on the issue.122
The Goldfarb oral argument further convinced Ginsburg that cases
whose harmful consequences to women were ambiguous would
only “jeopardiz[e] the forward movement we might generate in sex
discrimination cases more clearly entailing an adverse impact on
women.”123 In Goldfarb, Brennan could only muster a four-Justice
plurality for his opinion striking down the provision as discriminatory, with Stevens providing the fifth vote in a concurring
opinion.124 Though Goldfarb was an important victory, especially
121. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to E. Richard Larson (Oct. 14, 1976) (on file with
the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 2, folder: Califano v.
Goldfarb: Correspondence, 1976).
122. She’s Not Sure About Anti-male Prejudice, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 6, 1976, at 11A.
Justice Powell noted that Ginsburg “simply ducked this” question. Oral Argument Notes of
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Oct. 5, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School
of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699
Mathews v. Goldfarb).
123. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Jane Stevens, Legal Servs. for the Elderly Poor
(Oct. 15, 1976) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers,
container 2, folder: Califano v. Goldfarb: Correspondence, 1976).
124. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 200 (1977). Ginsburg was drawn to Stevens’s
approach in his concurring opinion. See Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to John H.
Fleming, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan (Aug. 15, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress
in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 2, folder: Califano v. Goldfarb: Correspondence,
1977-79) (“I liked Stevens’s approach in Goldfarb, his assessment of Kahn, and his
condemnation of laws, whether they discriminate immediately against men or women,
reflecting the legislators’ ‘traditional way of thinking about females.’”); see also Carol H. Falk,
Social Security Law on Widower Benefits is Ruled Discriminatory by High Court, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 3, 1977, at 2 (“‘In a way (Justice) Stevens understands the message I’ve been trying
to get across better than anyone,’ Mrs. Ginsburg said.”).
The center Justices wavered during the Court’s deliberations. Id. Stevens, for instance,
first voted to strike down the provision, then announced his intention to join the dissent, and
finally concurred in the Court’s judgment. Id.; see Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Oct. 21, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee
University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell
Archives, 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb); Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice
William H. Rehnquist [undated] (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of
Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699
Mathews v. Goldfarb). Justice Stewart reserved judgment at conference, then indicated his
admiration of Brennan’s opinion, then finally joined Rehnquist’s dissent. See Powell
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given its significant price tag,125 the Court had yet to issue a
coherent account of how to reliably distinguish between harmful
discrimination based on sex and legitimate affirmative action for
women.
In Califano v. Webster,126 decided three weeks after Goldfarb in
March 1977, the Court finally attempted to make sense of what had
become a tangled web of constitutional sex equality precedents. An
appeal from a federal district court ruling on a pro se plaintiff’s
petition that was never briefed by the parties, Webster seemed an
unlikely occasion for an important pronouncement.127 As Brennan
law clerk Jerry Lynch, a former student of Ginsburg’s, put it in a
letter to his professor two days after the ruling,
Somewhat oddly, the Court has seen fit to synthesize its cases
on gender discrimination purportedly “beneficial” to women by
Conference Notes, supra note 96; Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. (Dec. 14, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law
in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699 Mathews
v. Goldfarb) (“I think your proposed opinion for the Court is a remarkably fine job, and that,
given Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the result it reaches is close to unanswerable.”); Letter from
Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Jan. 4, 1977) (on file with the
Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court
Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb) (“After considerable backing and
filling, I have concluded that yours is the preferable conclusion in this case.”). Meanwhile,
Chief Justice Burger remained incredulous at Justice Powell’s joining Brennan’s plurality
opinion. He wrote to Rehnquist, “I join your dissent. It should convince even the most ardent
‘equal protector’!” Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice William H.
Rehnquist (Jan. 4, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 75-699 Mathews
v. Goldfarb). At the bottom of this letter, he typed a note to Powell: “Lewis, How can you not
agree with WHR!?” Id. These exchanges inspired Brennan to write a lengthy memo to his
colleagues refuting Rehnquist’s arguments. See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. (Jan. 6, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University
School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives,
75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb).
125. The extension of benefits to widowers cost the government an estimated $200 million
annually. Lesley Oelsner, Social Security Rules Upset Over Sex Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1977, at 69.
126. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurrence, joined
by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, in which he expressed puzzlement at the
different results in Goldfarb and Webster. Id. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the
judgment); see also infra note 142.
127. Pro se plaintiff Will Webster had won a favorable ruling from Judge Thomas C. Platt
of the Eastern District of New York, despite unfavorable decisions in similar challenges.
Webster v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 413 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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means of a summary reversal.... [T]he job was done without
benefit of briefing, and I suspect that to the extent the Court
really believes what the opinion says, it may be of considerable
importance.128

Lynch himself had drafted the Webster per curiam opinion,129 as
well as the Brennan plurality opinion in Goldfarb,130 and he
described his delicate balancing act in Webster as an “attempt[] to
confine legitimate ‘benign’ discrimination pretty narrowly, throwing
in a plug for absolute equality ... and yet preserving the possibility
that truly compensatory programs can be clearly identified.”131 The
opinion distinguished cases like Kahn, Ballard, and Webster, in
which the challenged law served the “permissible” goal of “redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women,”
from instances like Frontiero, Goldfarb, and Wiesenfeld, in which
“the classifications in fact penalized women wage earners.”132 The
legislative history of the social security provision challenged in
Webster, under which a female wage earner could exclude from the
computation of her average monthly wage three more lower-earning
years than a male wage earner for the purposes of calculating
benefits, made “clear that the differing treatment of men and
women ... was not ‘the accidental byproduct of a traditional way
of thinking about females,’ but rather was deliberately enacted
to compensate for the particular economic disabilities suffered
by women.”133 Ginsburg praised her student’s “fine” work.134 “Had
I been assigned the task, I could not have done better,” she

128. Letter from Jerry Lynch, law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg (Mar. 23, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, container 2, folder: Califano v. Goldfarb: Correspondence, 1977-79) [hereinafter
Lynch-Ginsburg Letter].
129. See Jerry Lynch, Draft 4, No. 76-457 Califano v. Webster [undated] (on file with the
Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I:425, folder 6).
130. He wrote to Ginsburg, “Dave Barrett tells me you said you felt like kissing Justice
Brennan when you heard about Goldfarb. If so, you should save at least a handshake for the
draftsman.” Lynch-Ginsburg Letter, supra note 128, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam).
133. Id. at 320 (citation omitted).
134. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Jerry Lynch, law clerk to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. (Mar. 28, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, container 2, folder: Califano v. Goldfarb: Correspondence, 1977-79).
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declared,135 and indeed, as she later noted, the Webster synthesis
bore a strong resemblance to the ACLU’s presentation in
Goldfarb.136
The Webster per curiam emphasized that “[r]eduction of the
disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by
the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized as ... an important governmental objective.”137 In cases where
the “classifications in fact penalized women wage-earners or when
the statutory structure and its legislative history revealed that the
classification was not enacted as compensation for past discrimination,” the Court explained, invalidation was appropriate.138 But the
statute challenged in Webster, the Court insisted, “operated directly
to compensate women for past economic discrimination.”139 Quoting
Kahn, the opinion noted that
[w]hether from overt discrimination or from the socialization
process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospi135. Id.
136. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Chapel Hill Address 2 (Sept. 22, 1978) (on file with the Library
of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 14, folder: Speech File, Sept. 22,
1978). Justice Powell called the ACLU’s brief in Goldfarb “elaborate and sophisticated.”
Powell “Aid to Memory” Memorandum, supra note 118, at 4.
The four Justices who dissented in Goldfarb wrote separately to indicate their belief that
the result in Webster, with which they agreed, was inconsistent with the result in Goldfarb.
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Initially, two of
these four, Stewart and Blackmun, signed on to Brennan’s per curiam opinion in Webster.
See Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Mar. 10, 1977) (on
file with the Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I:425, folder 6);
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Re: Califano v.
Webster [hereinafter Blackmun-Brennan I] (Mar. 14, 1977) (on file with the Library of
Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I:425, folder 6). After Chief Justice Burger
circulated a concurrence charging that Webster, though correct, was inconsistent with
Goldfarb, both Blackmun and Stewart abandoned the per curiam opinion. See Letter from
Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Re: Califano v. Webster
[hereinafter Blackmun-Brennan II] (Mar. 14, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress in
William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I:425, folder 6) (“The Chief’s circulation reached me after
I had sent my joinder to you earlier today. Inasmuch as he has written, and inasmuch as I
joined Bill Rehnquist in his Goldfarb dissent, I shall now join the Chief in the Webster case.
This means that I am not joining the proposed per curiam.”); Letter from Justice Potter
Stewart to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Mar. 16, 1977) (on file with the Library of
Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I:425, folder 6) (withdrawing from per
curiam).
137. 430 U.S. at 317.
138. Id. (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 318.
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table to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs. Thus,
allowing women, who as such have been unfairly hindered from
earning as much as men, to eliminate additional low-earning
years from the calculation of their retirement benefits works
directly to remedy some part of the effect of past discrimination.140

Not only did the statute operate in this compensatory fashion,
Justice Brennan’s per curiam stressed, but Congress had deliberately enacted the differential in order to remedy sex-based wage
disparities.141 That purpose, as well as the rule’s unambiguously
positive impact on wage-earning women, distinguished the
classification from the provision challenged in Goldfarb, according
to Brennan’s reasoning. The Goldfarb dissenters, not entirely
persuaded by this rationale, nevertheless concurred in the judgment with a brief opinion noting their doubts about the practicability of the Goldfarb/Webster distinction.142
Despite its relative obscurity, Webster had potentially significant implications that went far beyond Social Security benefit
schemes.143 Ginsburg believed that the Court’s reasoning could
140. Id.
141. Id. at 319-20. Justice Brennan’s emphasis on the intent behind the challenged
classification was consistent with his general approach of inquiring into the actual purpose
behind challenged legislation. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
For a contemporaneous critique of this approach, see Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 177, 181-82 (1977).
142. Webster, 430 U.S. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“While I am
happy to concur in the Court’s judgment, I find it somewhat difficult to distinguish the Social
Security provision upheld here from that struck down so recently in Califano v. Goldfarb ....
Although the distinction drawn by the Court between this case and Goldfarb is not totally
lacking in substance, I question whether certainty in the law is promoted by hinging the
validity of important statutory schemes on whether five Justices view them to be more akin
to the ‘offensive’ provisions struck down in [Wiesenfeld and Frontiero], or more like the
‘benign’ provisions upheld in [Ballard and Kahn].”). Chief Justice Burger was joined by
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. See also supra notes 126-36 and accompanying
text.
143. Goldfarb and Webster were hardly high-profile cases, but they did receive coverage
in the national press. Though their association with the dry topic of Social Security did not
make for great copy, the fiscal ramifications of extending benefits to a large new class of
recipients were potentially significant. For contemporaneous press coverage of Webster, see
Philip Hager, Supreme Court Grants Husbands Equality With Wives on Social Security
Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1977, at 5 (covering Goldfarb and Webster); Lesley Oelsner,
Sex Discrepancy in Old-age Funds Is Unanimously Upheld by Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1977, at 28 (covering Webster); Social Security Ruling Is Voided by High Court, WALL ST. J.,
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provide an excellent model for a case consuming much greater
public attention: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.144
She seized every opportunity in the months following the Webster
ruling to draw parallels between the two cases and to elaborate on
her earlier analysis in Gender and the Constitution.145 Webster,
Ginsburg repeatedly contended, could “serve as a framework for the
Court’s decision of the equal protection challenge by a white male
to a state medical school’s special minority admission program. The
program assailed in Bakke ... surely does not coincide with historic
role-typing nourished by race-based animus.”146 Instead, she
argued, the Court’s characterization of the Webster statute was
equally applicable to the U.C. Davis admissions program: “‘[T]he
only discernible purpose’ of the program [was] to redress ‘society’s
longstanding disparate treatment’ of [racial minorities]. And in
operation, the special admissions arrangement serves ‘directly to
remedy some part of the effect of past discrimination,’” as the Court
put it in the gender case.147 In law review articles, speeches, and
letters to the editor, Ginsburg reiterated the suggestion that
Webster was an excellent theoretical template for Bakke, as it
“attempt[ed] to preserve and bolster a general rule of equal
treatment while leaving a corridor open for genuinely compensatory
classifications,” and clarified “[t]he line between impermissible
adverse discrimination and permissible rectification.”148
The Webster/Bakke parallel had other attractions as well. In
addition to providing a handy conceptual framework, the Webster
paradigm shifted the focus of inquiry toward whether the U.C.
Davis affirmative action program stigmatized racial minorities, and
away from the burden imposed upon white applicants. In the
gender cases, the Court showed little concern for the effects of
Mar. 22, 1977, at 4 (covering Webster and noting that the decision saved the federal
government $13 billion).
144. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
145. See Ginsburg, supra note 101.
146. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women, Equality, & the Bakke Case, C.L. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1977, at 8, 14.
147. Id. Almost identical text appeared in Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Supreme
Court: The 1976 Term, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (Ronald K.L. Colins ed.,
1980); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art,
4 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 143, 146 (1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign
Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 824 (1978).
148. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Letter to the Editor, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 30, 1977, at 9.
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“benign” discrimination on men; rather, the inquiry focused on
whether women were helped or harmed by the preferential
treatment, and on whether the challenged laws supported a male
breadwinner/female homemaker model that assumed or perpetuated women’s economic dependency and inferiority. Transported to
the racial context, the idea that the hazard of affirmative action
programs was not so much their impact on the white majority as
their effect upon their intended beneficiaries’ opportunities to
transcend traditional, oppressive roles made such policies seem
more constitutionally palatable. Webster also stressed that the
impetus for the challenged law should be the result of a deliberate
effort to advance the status of women, rather than an “accidental
byproduct” of outdated stereotypes. Since race-based affirmative
action programs tended to be the result of recent, considered, and
well-intentioned efforts at remediation rather than of a reliance on
“tradition,” Webster’s focus on the process and purpose of enactment
seemed to bolster the legitimacy of such policies.
Moreover, the ruling in Webster suggested that generalized
societal discrimination was an adequate justification for sexconscious remedies, a proposition that was very controversial in
the debate over race-conscious programs. This ability to respond
to societal discrimination at the most general level was highly
relevant to cases like Bakke, where the challenged affirmative
action program was justified not by a recent history of overt
discrimination or segregation by the University of California itself,
but rather by the more diffuse effects of generalized social, educational, and professional disadvantage. Ironically, the Justices
seemed willing, in the case of women, to let this background
assumption of discrimination and disadvantage go virtually
unquestioned. Indeed, in the sex discrimination context, it was the
conservative Justices who were more, not less, inclined to acknowledge women’s comparative disadvantage. After years of being told
that their complaints about sex discrimination paled in comparison
to the grievances of victims of racial oppression, feminists now
confronted a constitutional climate friendlier in some sense to the
anti-subordination claims of women than to those of racial minorities.
Finally, for feminists, the race-sex analogy continued to hold
potential dividends for constitutional sex equality jurisprudence;
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reasoning from sex to extend intermediate scrutiny to race-based
affirmative action could imply a reciprocal borrowing of strict
scrutiny for invidious classifications based on sex as well as race.
The potential convergence of race and sex equality doctrine,
problematic in the period before Webster, now appeared promising
to feminists on multiple fronts. Feminists were not alone in seeing
the Webster ruling as an opportunity. The analytic and strategic
advantages of modeling the Bakke decision on the Court’s opinion
in Webster were compelling enough that the argument found its way
into several of the voluminous briefs filed in the case. Amici,
including the federal government, used the gender cases to argue
for the applicability of intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to
race-based affirmative action programs.149 And one friend of the
court presciently identified what Justice Stevens would, almost two
decades later, label an “anomalous result”: if the Court applied
strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action, it would erect a
higher barrier to remedial programs for racial minorities than that
which blocked either invidious discrimination against, or compensatory programs for, women.150
The United States’s submission offered the lengthiest discussion
of Webster and the other gender cases.151 The government’s brief,
the subject of much-publicized dissension within the Carter
Administration, took a middle-ground position on the U.C. Davis
admissions program that combined opposition to outright quotas
with an endorsement of some race consciousness in the consideration of applications.152 The United States used Webster to demon149. See Brief for the Bar Ass’n of San Francisco and the Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 549-50, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL
188000; Brief for Petitioner at 77, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811) (quoting Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 630, 648 (1975)), 1977 WL 187977; Brief for the State of Washington
and the University of Washington as Amicus Curiae at 23, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811),
1977 WL 189504.
150. Brief for the Bar Ass’n of San Francisco, supra note 149, at 45-46.
151. For other amicus discussions of the gender cases, see, for example, Brief for the Ass’n
of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 64-65, Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 187968; Brief for Columbia University et al. as Amici Curiae 29,
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1976 WL 181278; Brief for the Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae at 19, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1976 WL
178777; Brief for the Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae at 51 n.17, Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 189496. The majority of the many briefs submitted to
the Supreme Court in the Bakke case discussed only race, and did not mention gender.
152. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 38-40, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-
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strate the Court’s willingness to accept remedial programs designed
to overcome generalized discrimination: “[N]o institution is limited
to rectifying only its own discrimination,” the brief contended.153 “If
it were, the consequences of discrimination that spilled over from
the discriminator to society at large would be irreparable ....”154 The
Webster per curiam, the United States’s brief noted, established
that “compensation from public funds for essentially private
discrimination was constitutional. The same principle applies
here.”155 In Webster, the Court deemed it reasonable to give a
benefit to all women on the basis of past group disadvantage, even
though some argued that targeting lower-earning individuals or
only those individuals who could prove past discrimination was
constitutionally preferable.156 “So it is with minority applicants to
professional schools,” argued the government.157 Webster, and sex
equality doctrine generally, proved useful to an administration
seeking middle ground in part because these cases suggested a
limiting principle. The constitutional sex discrimination cases
demonstrated that it was possible to embrace the possibility of
remedial classifications in some circumstances without discounting
the potentially harmful consequences of group-based treatment in
others. The emerging sex equality doctrine acknowledged and even
highlighted the difficulties of line-drawing, but ultimately did not
despair of distinguishing between beneficial and detrimental
classifications.
The principles advanced in Webster were neither new nor unique,
of course, but rather were deeply rooted in the advocacy, scholarship, and jurisprudence of anti-racism, as well as in the evolving
doctrine of sex equality. Indeed, concerns about stigmatizing or
stereotyping beneficiaries of “benign” preferences, and about
“purportedly preferential race assignment[s]” that “may in fact
disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of
the plan’s supposed beneficiaries” inflected Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in a voting rights case decided three weeks before
811), 1977 WL 187970.
153. Id. at 39.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 39-40 (citation omitted).
156. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 152, at 64.
157. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 152, at 65.
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Webster, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey.158 More generally,
in the mid-1970s commentators were developing more sophisticated
theories that incorporated anti-subordination and anti-caste
principles into equal protection analysis. Perhaps most famously,
Yale Law Professor Owen Fiss argued in 1976 that instead of
pursuing a formal antidiscrimination principle focused on meansends rationality and individual harm, courts conducting an equal
protection inquiry should ask whether the challenged law or policy
inflicted group-disadvantaging status harm.159
What was unusual about the Webster/Bakke moment was the
potential for a convergence of race and sex equality doctrine that
acknowledged the reciprocal nature of the relationship between
these two often parallel, sometimes divergent, bodies of law. In the
past, commentators attempting to justify “preferential treatment”
or affirmative action based on race had largely ignored the ongoing
debates over the meaning of sex discrimination, at least as a source
of potentially fruitful parallels to race.160 To the extent that they
did mention sex or gender, it was usually in passing, as an afterthought, or occasionally as an example of inherently benign
discrimination that potentially validated a distinction between
invidious and harmless classification.161 For feminists, moreover,
158. 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
159. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, PHIL. & PUB. AFF., Winter
1976, at 107.
160. Indeed, some of the more influential defenses of “reverse racial discrimination”
seemed potentially inapplicable to, or at least weaker in, the context of “reverse sex
discrimination,” given women’s numerosity in the population and the difficulty of
characterizing women as a “discrete and insular minority.” John Hart Ely’s theory justifying
“benign” racial classifications relied upon a process-oriented conception of fairness,
suggesting that the imposition of disadvantage on the white majority by the white majority
deserved little judicial scrutiny. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
Not all defenses of race-based affirmative action were silent or cryptic on the topic of sexbased policies. One notable exception in the law review literature was law and philosophy
professor Richard Wasserstrom’s 1977 article, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment:
An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977). But Wasserstrom’s article, like most
of the work on this topic in other disciplines, did not discuss constitutional doctrine or case
law.
161. In his critical assessment of arguments for and against “preferential treatment”
based on race, John Kaplan argued that group treatment might in some cases be justified
despite differences between individuals within the group. He drew on the example of “laws
requiring shorter hours for women than for men,” which, he suggested, were “not based on
the supposition that all women are frailer and less healthy than all men.” John Kaplan,
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prior to Webster, the reverse parallel was self-defeating. Before the
Court had acknowledged that some supposedly “benign” classifications might in fact be constitutionally problematic, women’s rights
advocates saw sex equality doctrine as deeply misguided, hardly a
promising source of universal equal protection principles.162 The
willingness of the Court, in Webster, to acknowledge a distinction
between “genuine affirmative action” and laws that disadvantaged
women and perpetuated their subordinate status assuaged feminists’ concerns that any talk of constitutionally “benign” discrimination would ultimately redound to women’s detriment.
C. “A Lengthy and Tragic History that Gender-based
Classifications Do Not Share”: Reformulation Rejected
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke explicitly rejected the sex-race
parallel advanced by affirmative action proponents and applied
strict scrutiny to the U.C. Davis admissions policy. Although his
remarks on the relationship between race and sex classifications
attracted little attention outside legal feminist circles, they marked
a turning point in constitutional equality jurisprudence and in the
affirmative action debate more generally. After Powell declined to
apply the Webster synthesis to race-based affirmative action, the
respective jurisprudences of sex and race equality once again set
off on divergent, though certainly not independent, paths. The
doctrinal analogy between race and sex was alive and well, but
mostly functioned to circumscribe the recognition and remediation
of inequality. Meanwhile, the issues of gender and work-family
conflict that motivated Ginsburg’s mid-1970s reformulation of the
race-sex analogy never surfaced in the Supreme Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence.
The Bakke case produced more amicus briefs than any Supreme
Court case to date.163 After sifting through the submissions, Bob
Comfort, Justice Powell’s clerk, wrote a seventy-page memo to his
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro—The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 365 (1966).
162. See, for example, the discussion of Kahn and DeFunis, supra Part I.B.
163. The secondary literature on the Bakke case is similarly enormous. For book-length
studies of the case, see generally HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2000); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1988).
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boss summarizing and analyzing their content. “[T]he main battle
of the campaign,” he concluded, was the fight over which standard
of scrutiny to apply to U.C. Davis Medical School’s admissions
policy.164 Under strict scrutiny, the case was close; if an intermediate standard of review applied, requiring an “important,” rather
than a “compelling,” governmental interest, and a “substantial”
relationship rather than a “narrowly tailored” fit between means
and ends, then the policy was rather easily justifiable.165 Comfort’s
memo included an assessment of the “sex cases” and their applicability to the Bakke controversy.166 The line of precedents culminating in Webster “cut both ways,” Comfort argued: “They do indicate,
as Petitioner suggests, that discrimination in favor of disadvantaged groups is not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny. But they
also undercut Petitioner’s argument that the only beneficiaries of
equal protection analysis ... are minorities” who, by definition,
suffer a numerical disadvantage politically.167 The notion that a
majority might suffer disadvantage in the political arena despite its
numerosity, Comfort reasoned, “is precisely what Bakke and his
allies would argue” in order to establish the possibility for whites
to suffer unconstitutional reverse discrimination.168
Comfort recognized, however, the need to respond to the argument that “so-called ‘benign’ discrimination need not be strictly
scrutinized.”169 The question then became “whether there are
differences between racial classifications and sexual classifications,
which would support the application of different levels of
scrutiny.”170 Powell’s clerk identified what he considered to be a
crucial distinction: “With respect to sex, there are only two categories to be compared, men and women.... Therefore, the class-wide
questions of who has been hurt and who will be burdened are
164. Bench Memorandum from Bob Comfort, law clerk, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 16
(Aug. 29, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 35-36.
167. Id. at 35.
168. Id. at 36. Comfort continued: “And once it is conceded, Petitioner is cast adrift from
any neutral principle of majoritarian process and is left to argue about whose ox has been
gored how often and for how long.” Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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simple.”171 But, “[w]ith respect to race and ethnicity, the opposite is
true. The prejudice faced by every distinct racial and ethnic group
entering this country makes each a potential candidate for compensatory legislation.”172 Further, Comfort argued, “[i]n a melting pot
country, race and ethnicity have a peculiar capacity to inflame
which other distinctions lack.”173 In the margin of his clerk’s memo,
Powell wrote, “Good answer to possible reliance on ‘sex’ classifications not being subjected to strict scrutiny.”174
Meanwhile, Justice Brennan’s chambers was busy drafting what
Brennan hoped would be the opinion for the Court in Bakke.
Brennan’s drafts relied heavily on an analogy to the sex discrimination cases to promote the idea that benign distinctions were subject
to heightened scrutiny because of their potential to stigmatize
women and minorities, and to foster racial division; Craig-style
intermediate scrutiny would guard against such abuses.175 In a
memorandum to his colleagues, Brennan emphasized that the
concern “predominant in our sex discrimination cases,” as well as
in Brown v. Board of Education, was “stigma, insult, badge of
inferiority,” as epitomized in precedents that condemned “‘old
notions’ that demean[ed] women by denying them any place in the
‘world of ideas’ and [the Court’s] rejection of ‘traditional ways of
thinking’ that assume all members of the female sex to be dependents.”176 That element of stigma, Brennan argued, was “missing
from this case.”177 Brennan’s conception of “the proper judicial role”
in cases like Bakke was to “assure ... that the decision maker
relying on race intends no insult or slur to whites—that the reliance
[on race] is in fact a benign attempt to remedy discrimination in our
society.”178 Webster, Brennan concluded, “settled the propriety of
this when Congress deliberately legislated an advantage for women
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 37.
174. Id. at 36.
175. See William J. Brennan, Jr., First Working Draft of Bakke 16-23 (June 9, 1978) (on
file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 76-811 Regents v. Bakke).
176. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Conference 6 (Nov. 23, 1977) (on
file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 76-811 Regents v. Bakke) (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 13.
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to redress past societal discrimination. I should think the propriety
of the approach follows a fortiori in the case of reliance on race to
address past racial discrimination.”179
But Justice Powell had never accepted a full-blown parallel
between race and sex, and he was loath to do so now.180 Apart from
his concerns in Frontiero about circumventing constitutional
amendment processes, Powell had made clear in private communications about that case that he saw “no analogy between the type
of ‘discrimination’ which the black race suffered and that now
asserted with respect to women. The history, motivation and
results—in almost all aspects of the problem—were totally different.”181 Powell had seen the struggle over racial equality up close in
his years on the Richmond, Virginia, school board in the 1950s,
where his record was one of determined moderation on the segregation question and steadfast advocacy of higher educational standards.182 Although he never came to see discrimination against
women as fully comparable to that suffered by African Americans,
his approach to sex discrimination issues while on the Court might
be seen as loosely analogous to his position at the center of the
spectrum on racial desegregation, and, for that matter, race-based
affirmative action: cautious and deliberate, anxious to avoid bold
steps, and solicitous of the middle way.183
Just as in Frontiero, in which Powell’s concurrence assured the
invalidation of the challenged law but prevented feminists from
securing majority approval of a constitutional race analogy,
Powell’s was again the deciding vote in Bakke. Five Justices—
179. Id. at 14.
180. Though he joined Brennan’s opinion, Justice White wrote privately, “I am frank to
say that I don’t see much help in the gender classification cases, but if they don’t rub
someone else the wrong way, I don’t object.” Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., Re: 76-811—Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (June
13, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, box I:442,
folder 3). Blackmun, on the other hand, expressed to his colleagues “doubt that the sex
classification cases are so easily brushed aside [by Powell] just because they are ‘relatively
manageable’ and less complex.” Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the
Conference, Re: No. 76-811—Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 10 (May 1,
1978) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 260, folder 9).
181. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 2 (Mar.
1, 1973) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 71-1694 Frontiero v. Laird).
182. See JEFFRIES, supra note 89, at 160-68.
183. See id. at 169-72.
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Powell, Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun—agreed that
U.C. Davis could take race into account in making admissions
decisions; four Justices—Stevens, Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger,
and Stewart—concluded that the university’s policy violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act; Justice Powell found the program
constitutionally invalid.184 Because Powell was the only Justice to
concur in both elements of the Court’s holding—the constitutionality of taking race into account and the invalidity of U.C. Davis’s
particular vehicle for doing so—his was the opinion for the Court.185
When the Court decided Bakke in this splintered ruling, many
heralded the decision as a Solomonic balancing act that preserved
affirmative action while invalidating the type of remedy that most
troubled its critics—the quota.186 Whatever observers believed about
the gist of the Court’s decision, however, few found Powell’s opinion
for the Court particularly enlightening on the subject of gender and
state-sponsored affirmative action. In the course of refuting the
petitioner’s and amici’s analogies to school segregation, employment
discrimination, and sex discrimination cases, Powell offered an
oblique assessment of the differences between race and sex
discrimination that lit no clear path for those seeking guidance on
the status of sex-based affirmative action.187
Powell addressed the subject of sex discrimination in the course
of rejecting the University’s contention that the intermediate
scrutiny standard applicable in gender cases should apply to racebased affirmative action.188 Gender-based classifications were
different from racial categorization in two salient ways, he argued,
drawing both on Bob Comfort’s bench memo and on his own longheld views about the relationship between race and sex discrimination. First, sex-based distinctions were “less likely to create the
analytical and practical problems present in preferential programs
184. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
185. Id. at 266-68.
186. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, A Solomonic Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1978, at A25.
For more views, see Edward Fiske, Educators Welcome Bakke Ruling as Signal To Retain
Current Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1978, at A23; Paul Freund, Op-Ed., Bakke: The Choices
that Remain, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1978, at E17; John Herbers, Minority Leaders, After Review,
Regard Bakke Ruling as Setback, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1978, at A14; Tom Wicker, Op-Ed., Not
So Bad? Or Too Bad?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1978, at E15.
187. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300-03.
188. Id. at 302.
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premised on racial or ethnic criteria,” because “[w]ith respect to
gender there are only two possible classifications. The incidence of
the burdens imposed by preferential classifications is clear.”189 In
contrast to the race context,190 there were “no rival groups which
can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment.”191
But “[m]ore importantly,” wrote Powell, “the perception of racial
classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic
history that gender-based classifications do not share. In sum,” he
concluded, “the Court has never viewed such classification as
inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis.”192
Like his earlier drafts, Brennan’s opinion on behalf of himself,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun accepted many elements of the
petitioner’s analogy to the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.193 The opinion considered the gender cases a useful parallel
in evaluating the potential hazards of race-based affirmative
action.194 And, like the petitioners and their amici, Brennan and his
colleagues emphasized the dangers that remedial measures posed
to beneficiaries, rather than focusing on the burdens imposed on
other individuals.195 Moreover, the Brennan opinion also adopted
the argument articulated in Webster and Kahn, as well as in race
cases like UJO v. Carey, that remedial programs’ constitutional
legitimacy did not depend upon a specific finding that the institution granting the preference was guilty of past illegal discrimination.196 Justice Marshall’s separate opinion also cited Webster as
“recogniz[ing] the permissibility of remedying past societal discrimination through the use of otherwise disfavored classifications.”197
Because only four Justices endorsed these positions, however,
observers were left to puzzle over Powell’s more cryptic sentiments.
189. Id. at 302-03.
190. Id. at 303 (“The resolution of these same questions in the context of racial and ethnic
preferences presents far more complex and intractable problems than gender-based
classifications.”).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
194. Id. at 360.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 365.
197. Id. at 399 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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And puzzle they did. Legal feminists challenged both elements of
Powell’s distinction between race- and sex-based affirmative action
programs—his contention that the burdens and benefits of genderbased remedies were easier to discern, and his argument that sex
classifications lacked the long and tragic history that might
warrant stricter scrutiny. In a 1979 article, Nancy Gertner provided
a searing refutation of the Justice’s contention that the Court was
more competent to evaluate the invidiousness or benignity of
gender-based than race-based classifications.198 In fact, Gertner
argued, “courts have experienced difficulties in defining sex
discrimination ... which they never experienced in defining race
discrimination.”199 In reality, she posited, sex-based classifications
posed not only the same “analytic difficulties” as racial distinctions,
but also presented an additional set of complications.200 Like racebased affirmative action programs, compensatory gender classifications could burden other protected groups—minority men, for
instance.201 “Definitional” difficulties were also complex in the sex
discrimination context, in which differentiation based on physical
distinctions or sex role differences might not be as easily identified
as discriminatory.202 Gertner also pointed to the “conceptual problem of distinguishing paternalistic classifications which stereotype
women from ‘benign,’ affirmative action classifications.”203
Legal feminists also refuted the contention that gender-based
discrimination lacked a “lengthy and tragic history” worthy of
redress.204 Indeed, as Ginsburg emphasized in a panel discussion on
Bakke at the American Bar Association’s annual meeting in the
summer of 1978, the Court itself had recognized such a history on
several occasions.205 Although Ginsburg acknowledged that the
analogy between racial and gender inequality in the education
198. Nancy Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women: Pedestal or Cage?, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1979).
199. Id. at 173.
200. Id. at 179-80.
201. Id. at 180.
202. Id. at 179-80.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id. at 189 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)).
205. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Panel Discussion at the ABA Annual Meeting: Affirmative
Action: The Impact of the Bakke Decision 6 (Aug. 7, 1978) (on file with the Library of
Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 14, folder: Speech File, Aug. 7-30, 1978).
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context was imperfect, she wished that Powell had “indicate[d]
sharper perception of ... [the] similarities, as well as the differences,
in our society’s manifestations of race and sex discrimination.”206
Though the “history of sex discrimination and women’s struggle for
equality” was “a long and bitter one,”207 Gertner contended that the
“greatest tragedy of sex discrimination may well be its relative
subtlety.”208 She explained that “even today sex discrimination, and
particularly sex stereotypes, are not recognized as discrimination.”209 Indeed, Gertner argued that this problem of recognition
militated in favor of greater, not lesser scrutiny for gender-based
affirmative action.210
Powell’s treatment of gender in his Bakke opinion might be seen
in retrospect as an important turning point in constitutional
equality jurisprudence and in the affirmative action debate more
generally. Though some commentators minimized its importance,
stressing that Powell’s opinion only reflected the views of a single
Justice,211 the opinion helped to set the Court on a path toward
the “anomalous” differential constitutional treatment of race and
sex discrimination that survives to this day. In so doing, Bakke
perpetuated a pattern of Court decision making that utilized racesex parallels when feminists wanted to distinguish between race
and sex inequality, yet eschewed analogies when they worked to
advocates’ advantage.212 By refusing to apply principles developed
in sex equality cases to race-based affirmative action, Powell’s
opinion rejected not merely the applicability to race cases of the less
stringent standard of review developed in sex equality doctrine, but
206. Id. at 6-7; see also Gertner, supra note 198, at 189.
207. Gertner, supra note 198, at 191.
208. Id. at 194.
209. Id. at 191.
210. Id. at 195-96 (“The arguments which Justice Powell uses to justify a less exacting
standard of review for sex-based classifications seem rather to justify the opposite result.”);
see also Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (arguing that strict
scrutiny is best viewed as a device for “smoking out” illegitimate intent).
211. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term—Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 9 & n.33 (1978) (“Immediate media coverage of
Bakke gave inordinate attention to Powell’s opinion ....”); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment,
Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92
HARV. L. REV. 864, 865 (1979) (“It would be foolhardy to attempt to derive too much meaning
from Bakke’s message in the area of equal protection ....”).
212. The Court’s decision in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney is an example of this trend,
which I explore elsewhere. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 2.
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also sidelined a more capacious conceptualization of discrimination’s meaning, effects, and remediation. Moreover, it helped set the
stage for the doctrinal divergence between constitutional race
and sex equality law, and for a disjuncture between an affirmative
action debate focused on race-based policies, and issues of work/
family balance and gender role reformation that feminists saw as
crucial to women’s present economic disadvantage and future
progress.
III. THE REVERSE ANALOGY’S AFTERLIFE
This final Part explores a few of the ways in which the complex
relationship between the constitutional jurisprudence of sex
equality and of race-based affirmative action has developed since
the Bakke decision. The first section examines the phenomenon of
divergence—the “anomalous result” predicted in the 1970s and
emergent by the 1990s. The second section then offers some
observations about how issues of gender, work, and family—the
central concerns of sex equality law—have been submerged in
affirmative action doctrine and discourse over the past few decades.
Despite these trends, however, Justice Ginsburg’s opinions have
retained the spirit and substance of her earlier advocacy, including
an attempted convergence between race and sex equality doctrines,
as the third section demonstrates.
A. Divergence: An “Anomalous” Result
Constitutional sex equality jurisprudence and race-based
affirmative action doctrine, which had developed along fairly
separate trajectories in the 1970s, briefly crossed paths in the 197778 Term when the Webster synthesis appeared to provide a handy
precedent for those who had long attempted to develop a distinction
between harmful discrimination and beneficial remediation.213
213. In the brief window between the Webster and Bakke decisions, citations to Webster
appeared in lower court opinions upholding race-based affirmative action programs. In
Constructors Ass’n of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, a Third Circuit panel cited Webster to
support the proposition that race-conscious remedial programs might be an appropriate
means of combating discrimination, just as “preferential social security provisions” were
“upheld as [a] remedy for general economic discrimination against women.” 573 F.2d 811, 816
& n.15 (3d Cir. 1977). In Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Kreps, a Rhode
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Subsequent to Bakke, however, courts considering the constitutionality of affirmative action plans based on race rarely cited Webster
or other sex equality cases except to distinguish them.214 Powell’s
Bakke opinion, initially perceived as an outlier, gradually gained
adherents. In Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980),215 the Court upheld a
minority business enterprise program, but to the dismay of concurring Justice Powell, did not articulate clearly a standard of
review for racial classifications.216 Justice Powell’s position on strict
scrutiny gradually triumphed over the following decade, however.
Moreover, his rejection of the applicability of Webster to race-based
affirmative action also gained ground.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, decided in 1982,
the Court invalidated MUW’s exclusion of men from its nursing
program in an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.217 Justice
Powell wrote a vehement dissent in Hogan, reiterating his view
that sex and race discrimination were fundamentally incomparable, at least in the context of educational segregation.218 But
although Powell and O’Connor parted ways in Hogan, Powell
would find O’Connor a more kindred judicial spirit in her approach
Island federal district judge declared that there was no “doubt that Congress may, for the
common benefit, remedy economic disparity which has resulted from discrimination.” 450 F.
Supp. 338, 349 (D.R.I. 1978) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)). The judge also
noted that, as in Webster, the challenged “statute’s legitimate purpose is not overshadowed
by a stigmatizing effect or purpose, or an outmoded stereotype.” Id. at 352.
214. After Bakke, few briefs in race cases cited Webster. For exceptions, see Brief for
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340), 1985 WL 669746; Brief
for the Secretary of Commerce at 57 n.31, Fullilove v. Kreps, 444 U.S. 948 (1979) (No. 781007), 1979 WL 199310 (citing Webster as an analogous instance in which “minority status
is ... the only classification that can be used, because the congressional objective ... was the
elimination of the effects of past discrimination”).
215. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
216. See id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I would place greater emphasis than the
Chief Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review in conventional terms
....”). Justice Stevens dissented in Fullilove, at one point citing Goldfarb to support the
proposition that if the challenged classification did not in fact benefit the most disadvantaged
members of the group, it should not be upheld as truly remedial. Id. at 538 n.9 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
217. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
218. Id. at 742 n.9 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Even the Court does not argue that the
appropriate standard here is ‘strict scrutiny’—a standard that none of our ‘sex
discrimination’ cases ever has adopted. Sexual segregation in education differs from the
tradition, typified by the decision in [Plessy v. Ferguson], of ‘separate but equal’ racial
segregation.”).
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to race-based affirmative action.219 In Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education (1986), Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist joined
Powell’s plurality opinion for the Court, embracing strict scrutiny
as the appropriate standard of review for all race-based classifications.220 Indeed, Powell’s plurality opinion in Wygant cited Hogan
for the proposition that “the level of scrutiny does not change
merely because the challenged classification operates against a
group that historically has not been subject to governmental
discrimination.”221 But although the Wygant plurality recognized
Hogan, a gender case, as a relevant precedent, it ignored Webster’s
lesson that remedying societal discrimination against women was
a sufficiently important governmental objective to withstand
scrutiny; Powell wrote, “Societal discrimination, without more, is
too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.”222
Three years later, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Justice
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court struck down a minority business
enterprise set-aside, applying strict scrutiny.223
In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, decided the following year, the
Court appeared to carve out an exception to the strict scrutiny rule,
upholding a congressional enactment designed to increase broadcast
diversity.224 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion, joined by the same
three Justices who joined his Bakke opinion, applied intermediate
scrutiny and cited Wiesenfeld and Hogan to support the contention
that “an examination of the legislative scheme and its history ... will
separate benign measures from other racial classifications.”225
Justice O’Connor’s dissent, however, called “‘benign’ racial classifications” a “contradiction in terms,” and she cited Wiesenfeld, Webster,
and Goldfarb as evidence that legislation passed by Congress was
not immune from rigorous scrutiny.226 Five years later, in Adarand
219. Justice O’Connor would later adopt Justice Powell’s approach to race-based
affirmative action in her pivotal opinion upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s
policy as narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling governmental interest in educational
diversity. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
220. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
221. Id. at 273.
222. Id. at 276.
223. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
224. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
225. Id. at 565 n.12.
226. Id. at 605, 609 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Constructors v. Pena,227 a majority of the Court vindicated Justice
O’Connor’s position. Her opinion in Adarand eliminated any
lingering uncertainty about the standard of review for race-based
affirmative action, confirming that strict scrutiny applied regardless of which governmental entity enacted the policy. The Court
struck down the challenged policy on the grounds that “consistency”
required the application of the same standard of review to allegedly
“benign” classifications as to “invidious” distinctions, and that
“congruence” dictated the application of that standard to both state
and federal actions.228 It was in Adarand that Justice Stevens
criticized the “anomalous result” of the doctrines of consistency and
congruence, noting its apparent implication that affirmative action
for women would be easier to enact than affirmative action for
African Americans, for whom the equal protection guarantee
originally was intended.229 After the Court’s decisions in Croson
and Adarand, most lower courts have interpreted the requirements
of “consistency” and “congruence” to require that gender- and racebased affirmative action—even when coexisting within the same
policy or program—be judged by different constitutional standards.230
Ginsburg herself identified this “anomalous” result in 1978.231
“Does [Powell’s opinion] mean preferential treatment ordered by a
government agency for women is less susceptible to challenge in
court than preferential treatment for blacks?” queried Ginsburg in
a speech at New York University.232 “Turning the coin on the other
side, does Powell mean courts should continue to tolerate official
227. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
228. Id. at 225.
229. Id. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., Eng’g Contractors Ass’n v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir.
1997) (applying strict scrutiny to racial component of affirmative action plan but
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based component). For more on this disjuncture, see Sidney
Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of Justice, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 149 (2002);
Heather Nelson, “Fatal in Fact”? An Examination of the Viability of Affirmative Action for
Women in the Post-Adarand Era, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151 (2000).
231. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speech at New York University (Aug. 30, 1978) (on file with
the Library of Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 35, folder: Speech File,
Aug. 1978); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks at Panel Discussion on the Bakke
Decision, New York Women’s Bar Ass’n 35 (Sept. 20, 1978) (on file with the Library of
Congress in Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, container 14, folder: Speech File, Sept. 20, 1978).
232. Ginsburg, Speech at New York University, supra note 231.
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discrimination against women to a greater extent than they tolerate
such discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities?”233 To
Ginsburg this seemed counterintuitive: under her theory, and
Gertner’s, sex-based classifications were, if anything, more problematic than race-based distinctions because judges were more
likely to mislabel legal favors based on stereotypes as legitimate
compensation. Because the true nature of sex-based classifications
was more difficult to discern than that of racial distinctions, at a
minimum such classifications required the same careful examination.
The divergent treatment of race and sex classifications intensified the legal feminists’ dilemma. Women’s rights advocates faced
the conundrum that arguing for strict scrutiny for sex-based
classifications might imperil affirmative action based on sex as well
as race, whereas arguing for the constitutionality of sex-conscious
affirmative action could further confuse judges who were unable to
distinguish such policies from the old protective laws. Once Justice
Powell’s view that strict scrutiny should apply to all racial classifications regardless of their intent or effect garnered additional
votes,234 the dilemma deepened. Analogizing sex to race was still
tempting as an antidote to invidious discrimination against women,
but now seemed even more dangerous in the affirmative action
arena. And because most of the remaining protectionist sex-based
classifications were disappearing from the statute books through
judicial and legislative action, preserving and extending the
affirmative action remedy began to seem, to some feminists, more
pressing than achieving absolute formal equality.235
Although Gertner’s 1979 critique lamented the allegedly spurious
distinctions Powell drew between race and sex discrimination, she
also recognized quite clearly how the extension of Powell’s Bakke
reasoning to gender-based classifications “would be costly to those
programs that most would agree are genuinely within the category
233. Id. Justice Stevens would, almost two decades later, identify the same “anomaly” in
his dissent in the 1995 case Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), which
conclusively established strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard for all race-based
classifications, including those used in state and federal government contracting programs.
234. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
235. By the late 1970s, feminists increasingly confronted questions about the
constitutionality of affirmative action under the proposed ERA. See MAYERI, REASONING
FROM RACE, supra note 2.
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of affirmative action for women.”236 Indeed, Gertner feared that the
Bakke standard “would be far more costly to sex-based than to racebased affirmative action.”237 Bakke suggested that the “[f]indings
which will satisfy the Court ... are those that are finely tuned to
discrimination of a particular sort: intentional discrimination,
perpetrated by identifiable wrongdoers, and directed at identifiable
victims.”238 These elements of intent and specificity, difficult enough
to prove in the race context, were even more elusive when it came
to sex discrimination, Gertner argued, making the assignment of
fault to a particular employer or institutional entity difficult.239 And
given the propensity of equal protection analysis to bleed into Title
VII jurisprudence, Gertner worried that voluntary affirmative
action for women in employment could be eviscerated by the
extension of the Bakke standard.240
The legal feminist critiques of Powell’s Bakke opinion thus
brought into stark relief the ways in which developments in the
Court’s race discrimination jurisprudence had problematic and
often paradoxical effects on the already confused constitutional
landscape of sex equality. As the Court leaned toward applying
strict scrutiny even to compensatory racial classifications, analogies between race- and sex-based affirmative action grew more
dangerous. The Court’s increasing reliance on intent as a primary
indicator of redressable discrimination made proving past sex
discrimination for the purpose of justifying affirmative action
remedies even more difficult. Applying different standards of review
to sex- and race-based affirmative action also had potentially
problematic consequences for coalitions between feminists and
racial justice advocates.241
On the other hand, the “anomalous” result did leave the door
open for a more expansive conception of permissible sex-based
236. Gertner, supra note 198, at 196.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 197.
239. Id. at 203.
240. Id. at 205-08.
241. See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action and Ethnic Niches: A Legal Afterword,
in COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR
AMERICA 313, 315-16 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001) (“If programs jointly proposed and
designed to meet the interests of both women and minorities survive legal scrutiny as to
women but not as to minorities, the coalition will break apart.”).
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affirmative action, and for the development of a flexible jurisprudence that might yet exert influence on decision making in race
cases. After all, four Justices embraced Ginsburg’s sex-race analogy
in Bakke,242 and intermediate scrutiny was still very much alive as
a framework for thinking about “benign” classifications. Webster’s
clear statement that past societal discrimination against women
could justify remedial sex-based classifications commanded virtual
unanimity on the Court and has never been repudiated.243 But as
Powell’s Bakke opinion foreshadowed, the potential for sex equality
jurisprudence to move race doctrine in a more remedy-friendly
direction would not be realized in the near term.244
B. Submergence: Gender in the Affirmative Action Debate
Though they had successfully eradicated the constitutional
presumption of legitimacy for laws that assumed or ratified the
male-breadwinner/female-homemaker model, by the late 1970s,
many legal feminists were pessimistic about the prospects for using
the existing antidiscrimination framework to address the issues
of work-family conflict that plagued feminist efforts to integrate
women as equal members of the workforce. In an important 1979
article entitled Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market
Hostility to Working Mothers, Mary Joe Frug systematically documented the disadvantages mothers confronted in the workplace,
and concluded that existing antidiscrimination laws were mostly
inadequate tools for effecting improvement.245 The constitutional
requirement of discriminatory intent and the business necessity
defense to Title VII disparate impact claims, as well as the general
limitations of litigation as a tool for social change, led Frug to
argue that positive steps such as child care support and flex242. See supra notes 144-48, 193-97 and accompanying text.
243. Indeed, sometime women’s rights skeptic Justice Rehnquist arguably was the most
steadfast supporter of this principle. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law
Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1475 (2002). See generally Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way,
Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1871 (2006) (discussing Rehnquist’s evolving views on sex equality).
244. Powell himself continued to resist analogies between race and sex discrimination.
See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 735 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
245. 59 B.U. L. REV. 55, 102 (1979).

1846

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1789

time arrangements were necessary to solve working mothers’
dilemmas.246
Frug saw affirmative action to help women enter nontraditional
jobs as important, but she echoed Ginsburg’s 1975 assessment that
[a]ffirmative action to end occupational segregation cannot occur
in a vacuum .... Because occupational segregation is closely
linked to the primary responsibility women feel and bear for
child care, changes in occupational choice for women must occur
simultaneously with changes in child care support systems and
in the way the labor market treats disruptions caused by child
care responsibilities.247

Frug assumed, though, that such policies would come about through
legislative and voluntary efforts, if at all; courts, she believed, were
unlikely to find the lack of child care and leave options to be
discrimination in need of judicial remedy.248
Had the Court taken up the invitation to integrate its sex
equality case law with that of race-based affirmative action, such a
convergence might have injected some of the concerns animating
legal feminists’ crusade against sex discrimination into the
affirmative action debate. Instead, the majority’s failure to apply
the reasoning of its sex equality cases to Bakke’s race-based
affirmative action policy arguably reinforced a disjuncture between
the debate over affirmative action on the one hand, and discussions
of gender and family caregiving on the other. In the following years,
affirmative action in the arenas of public debate and Supreme
Court jurisprudence continued to be, first and foremost, about

246. Id. at 95-102.
247. Id. at 99.
248. For other examples of this view, see, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond
the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job,
26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78 (2003) (describing feminists’ traditional pessimism about the
possibilities for using litigation to address work-family conflict).
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race.249 To this day, the Supreme Court has not considered an equal
protection challenge to a gender-based affirmative action program.
Of course, the submergence of gender in the affirmative action
debate does not stem only from the Court’s constitutional distinction between race- and sex-based classifications. Indeed, in the Title
VII context—in which the race-sex parallel reigns as a matter of
official text, if not legislative history—gender and the intrafamily
division of labor have not played much more of a role than in the
constitutional debate over affirmative action. Though comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief look at Title
VII jurisprudence, which has diverged from the constitutional law
of affirmative action in complicated ways, also reflects the submergence of the particular questions associated with sex-based
remedial programs. The leading Title VII voluntary affirmative
action case, United Steelworkers v. Weber, addressed only the racial
element of a job training set-aside that reserved half of its slots for
African Americans and 5 percent for women.250 Legal feminists were
249. For more on the relative silence about women, especially white women, in affirmative
action discourse, see PHILIP F. RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 1619-2000, at 180
(2001); Barbara T. Christian, Camouflaging Race and Gender, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 225, 227 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1999); Mari J. Matsuda,
Feminism and Affirmative Action, in WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 151, 163, 167 (Charles R. Lawrence III & Mari J. Matsuda eds., 1997);
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
DEBATE 39, 47 (George E. Curry ed., 1996); Carol M. Swain et al., Understanding Racial
Polarization on Affirmative Action: The View from Focus Groups, in COLOR LINES, supra note
241, at 214, 226; Comments of Janine Jackson, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 227 (1998-2000);
Kimberle Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a Pro-active Defense of Affirmative
Action, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 196 (1998-2000); Darlene C. Goring, Silent Beneficiaries:
Affirmative Action and Gender in Law School Academic Support Programs, 84 KY. L.J. 941
(1995-96); Pamela J. Smith, Part I—Romantic Paternalism—The Ties That Bind Also Free:
Revealing the Contours of Judicial Affinity for White Women, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE
107 (1999); Tim Wise, Is Sisterhood Conditional?: White Women and the Rollback of
Affirmative Action, NWSA J., Fall 1998, at 1. For an argument that feminists have used the
allegedly greater gains of white women from affirmative action as a rhetorical ploy to defend
race-based affirmative action, see Sacha E. de Lange, Toward Gender Equality: Affirmative
Action, Comparable Worth, and the Women’s Movement, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
315 (2007).
On the greater public support for gender-based affirmative action than for race-based
policies, see Dara Z. Strolovitch, Playing Favorites: Public Attitudes Toward Race- and
Gender-targeted Anti-discrimination Policy, NWSA J., Fall 1998, at 26. For a helpful
comparative view, see CAROL LEE BACCHI, THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: “WOMEN,”
EQUALITY AND CATEGORY POLITICS (1996).
250. 443 U.S. 193, 193 (1979).
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well aware that the case had important ramifications for the future
of sex-based affirmative action: several amici briefs addressed the
impact of the Court’s forthcoming decision on women,251 feminist
organizations lent their support to affirmative action’s defenders,252
and African American and female workers attempted to intervene
in the case to present evidence of past discrimination against them
by the defendants.253 But gender did not figure into either the
Court’s decision or popular coverage of the case.254
Then, when a sex-based affirmative action program did reach the
Supreme Court via a Title VII challenge in the 1987 case Johnson
v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara,255 feminists had good
reason to argue a straight parallel to race, without further ado or
embellishment. An unusually unambiguous victory for civil rights
advocates, Weber had established the validity of private employercreated voluntary affirmative action programs, and feminists’ best
hope was that the Court would simply apply Weber to the public
251. Civil rights and feminist organizations issued a joint Statement of Principles,
declaring that “[t]his country cannot attain true equality of opportunity without affirmative
action.” Brief for American G.I. Forum et al. as Amici Curiae at app. A: Statement of
Principles, Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (Nos. 78-432, -435, -436), 1979 WL 199758. The statement
insisted that “Title VII and the anti-discrimination principle must be understood in the
context of our nation’s history of discrimination against non-white people and women and its
resulting national patterns of underrepresentation and inequality in the workforce.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also Brief for the Women’s Caucus, District 31 of the United
Steelworkers of America as Amicus Curiae, Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (No. 78-432), 1979 WL
199770; Brief for Women’s Equal Rights Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (Nos. 78-432, -435, -436), 1979 WL
199749; Brief for the Honorable Patricia Schroeder et al. as Amici Curiae, Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (Nos. 78-432, -435, -436), 1979 WL 199756.
252. See Letter from Frances M. Beal, Kathleen A. Gmeiner, and Gerald C. Horne, to
Friends (Mar. 9, 1979) (NOW LDEF Papers, 95-M79, Carton 8, Folder: Weber v. Kaiser) (“We
are issuing a call for broad unity of labor, civil rights, women’s community, religious and
other interested organizations in defense of affirmative action and in opposition to the Weber
suit.”); Letter from Kathe Karlson, Coordinator, N.Y. Affirmative Action Task Force, to Dear
Friend [of the National Anti-Weber Mobilization Committee] (June 1979) (NOW LDEF
Papers, 95-M79, Carton 8, Folder: Weber v. Kaiser); Memorandum from Sue to Phyllis and
Stephanie, Re: Report on Affirmative Action Coordinating Center Meeting of Today re: Weber
Case (Dec. 27, 1978) (NOW LDEF Papers 95-M79, Carton 8, Folder: Weber v. Kaiser).
253. Motion of Rudy Gorden et al., individually and on behalf of Black and Women
Workers at Gramercy, for Special Leave to Intervene and for an Order Vacating the
Judgment Below and Remanding for a New Trial with Intervenors as Party Defendants and
to File a Brief in Support, Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (Nos. 78-432, -435, -436), 1979 WL 213604.
254. See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, The Bakke Case Moves to the Factory, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Feb. 25, 1979, at 37.
255. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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employment policy attacked in Johnson256 and uphold it.257 Arguably, highlighting differences between race and sex inequality could
only jeopardize their cause. In Johnson, the Court did apply Weber
in a fairly straightforward manner, offering no elaboration of the
relationship between race- and sex-based affirmative action other
than an implicit parallel.258 Indeed, like feminist advocates, the
majority in Johnson understandably relied on stare decisis to avoid
reopening the thorny controversy about statutory meaning that a
too-thorough reexamination of Weber would have implicated.259
The Court missed an opportunity to integrate its sex and race
equality jurisprudence in Bakke, in which Powell’s assertion of disanalogy discouraged the transfer of concepts from sex to race
cases.260 Almost a decade later, a majority of the Justices assumed
some unarticulated congruence between race and sex in Johnson,
in which the analogy obviated the need for a separate discussion of
sex-based affirmative action.261 Meanwhile, legal developments
256. Although Johnson concerned public employment, the plaintiff’s attorney chose not
to raise the constitutional issue below. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON TRIAL:
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN JOHNSON V. SANTA CLARA 55-56 (1997).
257. The briefs supporting the respondent in Johnson urged exactly that. See Brief of
Respondent Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129),
1986 WL 728165; Brief for the State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728161.
258. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627-40.
259. The Johnson dissenters did not hesitate to pinpoint the ways in which the majority
glossed over potential distinctions between the affirmative action policies challenged in
Weber and Johnson, respectively. Justice White criticized the majority for failing to
reconsider and overrule Weber, and charged that the Court’s ruling in Johnson went even
further than Weber:
My understanding of Weber was, and is, that the employer’s plan did not violate
Title VII because it was designed to remedy intentional and systematic
exclusion of blacks by the employer and the unions from certain job
categories.... The Court now interprets [“traditionally segregated job
categories”] to mean nothing more than a manifest imbalance between one
identifiable group and another in an employer’s labor force.
480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissent accused the majority of
departing not only from accepted principles of statutory interpretation, but also from
Wygant’s holding that “the objective of remedying societal discrimination cannot prevent
remedial affirmative action from violating the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 664 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Scalia also developed further White’s distinction between Weber and Johnson,
arguing that the job categories at issue in Johnson were not “segregated” as a result of
“conscious, exclusionary discrimination,” but rather that “because of longstanding social
attitudes, it has not been regarded by women themselves as desirable work.” Id. at 667-68.
260. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302-03 (1978).
261. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616.
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made feminists pessimistic about courts’ ability to address workfamily conflict. As a result, what Ginsburg, Frug, and other legal
feminists saw as a primary cause of women’s economic plight and
a distinctive attribute of sex inequality—the gendered division of
family labor—never surfaced in what we think of as the Supreme
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.
From a political standpoint, this divergence may in fact be a
blessing to advocates of progressive work-family policy, who
understandably might hesitate to link their universalist goals with
a controversial program perceived as benefitting some at the
expense of others. In that sense, Justice Powell’s emphasis on
diversity and its universal benefits262 does capture one of the virtues
of sex equality doctrine: its claim to benefit both the disadvantaged
and the comparatively advantaged groups. But the Court’s jurisprudence severely limits the role that the amelioration of societal
discrimination can play in race-based affirmative action programs.
Race doctrine as it has evolved in the years since Bakke is a far cry
from Webster’s matter-of-fact acceptance of societal discrimination
as a justification for broad affirmative action policies.
C. Convergence: Justice Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence
Still, the parallel to sex equality doctrine that Ginsburg advanced
as an advocate in the 1970s has not disappeared altogether. In fact,
her own opinions as a Justice have drawn, sometimes implicitly,
upon principles similar to those that animated her earlier advocacy.
In United States v. Virginia, Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court
reaffirmed the validity of sex classifications that “compensate
women for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,
[that] promot[e] equal employment opportunity, [and that] advance
full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people,”
even as she condemned classifications that “create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”263 Although
arguably strengthening the “skeptical scrutiny” accorded to classifications that excluded women or limited their opportunities,
Ginsburg was careful not to undermine the Webster precedent.
262. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-14.
263. 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Promoting women’s advancement and equal participation in the
society, the polity, and the economy was, Ginsburg essentially
declared, an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”264 As Lawrence
Sager has suggested, Ginsburg’s analysis in United States v.
Virginia offered potentially radical implications for race as well as
sex equality jurisprudence.265 By departing from the rigid “tiers-ofscrutiny” approach and drawing a sharp distinction between both
exclusion and inclusion subordination and remediation, Ginsburg
invited, in Sager’s words, “an inversion of the traditional dependency of gender discrimination adjudication on lessons from the
analogy of race.”266
Indeed, Ginsburg’s opinions in race-based affirmative action
cases bear traces of just such an application. In her dissent in
Adarand, she stressed “the considerable field of agreement” among
the Justices and interpreted the lead opinion to “strongly suggest[]
that the strict standard announced is indeed ‘fatal’ for classifications burdening groups that have suffered discrimination in our
society,” but in contrast, “[f]or a classification made to hasten the
day when ‘we are just one race’ ... the lead opinion has dispelled the
notion that ‘strict scrutiny’ is ‘fatal in fact.’”267 Ginsburg read
Adarand to revitalize the distinction between what were once
referred to as “invidious” and “benign” classifications, just as her
United States v. Virginia opinion appeared to vanquish forever
classifications that excluded women from opportunities while
reaffirming the validity of genuine efforts to promote inclusion and
opportunity. Ginsburg’s optimistic reading of Adarand thus quietly
bridged the gap between the sex equality jurisprudence she
pioneered as an advocate and a Justice, and the race doctrine she
now sought to shape.
Ginsburg injected the values of the Webster synthesis into her
Adarand dissent in two additional ways: first, by emphasizing
legislators’ prerogative to address the present effects of past societal
discrimination, and second, by characterizing the primary purpose
264. Id. at 531-34.
265. Sager, supra note 4, at 821-23.
266. Id. at 824; see also Shira Galinsky, Returning the Language of Fairness to Equal
Protection: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence in Grutter and
Gratz and Beyond, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 357, 363-66 (2004).
267. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 271, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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of heightened scrutiny as a device for preventing harm to the
policy’s intended beneficiaries. She invoked “Congress’ authority to
act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to
counteract discrimination’s lingering effects,”268 and cited voluminous evidence of continuing societal bias against people of color.269
In one study she referenced, of testers negotiating retail automobile
purchase prices, white women fared significantly worse than white
men, but black men, and especially black women, received final
price offers two to three times those of white males and one and a
half to two times those of white females.270 Ginsburg did not cite
Webster, but the implicit message came through: if societal
discrimination is a sufficient justification for ameliorating sex
inequality, why would race—the cause of even greater disadvantage—be different? Ginsburg did rely explicitly on the sex equality
cases later in her opinion to assert that, far from being “‘fatal in
fact,’ ... review that is searching [is necessary] to ferret out classifications in reality malign, but masquerading as benign. The Court’s
once lax review of sex-based classifications demonstrates the need
for such suspicion.”271 In other words, the primary purpose of
heightened scrutiny was not to eradicate classifications for the sake
of color- or sex-blindness per se, but rather to ensure that
policymakers did not disguise invidious intent in the costume of
solicitude as they had once done in cases like Hoyt v. Florida272 and
Goesaert v. Cleary.273 Ginsburg summed up: “Today’s decision thus
usefully reiterates that the purpose of strict scrutiny is precisely to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking, to differentiate between permissible and
impermissible governmental use of race, to distinguish between a
No Trespassing sign and a welcome mat.”274
Several years later, in her dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger, Ginsburg
reiterated her belief that the “consistency” invoked in Adarand
should not be a vehicle for ignoring the principle that “government
268. Id. at 273.
269. Id. at 273-76.
270. Id. at 274 n.4.
271. Id. at 275 (citations omitted).
272. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
273. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
274. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 275-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of
exclusion and inclusion.”275 Ginsburg acknowledged that “[t]he mere
assertion of a laudable governmental purpose ... should not
immunize a race-conscious measure from careful judicial inspection.”276 She echoed, but did not cite, the language of the sex
equality doctrine her advocacy helped to produce: “[T]he mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic
shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes
underlying a statutory scheme.”277 In her concurring opinion in
Grutter v. Bollinger, Ginsburg was careful to note that the case
[did] not require the Court to revisit whether all governmental
classifications by race, whether designed to benefit or to burden
a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the
same standard of judicial review ... [or] whether interests other
than “student body diversity” rank as sufficiently important to
justify a race-conscious government program.278

The door, Ginsburg seemed to suggest, remained open to a synthetic
interpretation of the Court’s equality jurisprudence—one that drew
explicitly or implicitly on the conceptual framework she had
developed and elaborated as an advocate.
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE LEGACY OF LEGAL FEMINISM
Recovering the history of the reformulated race-sex analogy both
illuminates an underappreciated aspect of legal feminism’s legacy
and suggests more expansive possibilities for contemporary equality
doctrine. Nineteen-seventies legal feminism has been characterized,
and criticized, as overemphasizing formal equality of treatment at
the expense of other values.279 Commentators have questioned
advocates’ use of male plaintiffs,280 lamented the elevation of
275. 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 302.
277. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975), quoted in Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977); id. at 224 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
278. 539 U.S. 306, 346 n.* (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
279. See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, Thirty Years, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147 (2001).
280. See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, Gender Equality: States as Laboratories, 80 VA. L. REV.
945, 958 (1994).
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abstract equality over the valuation of difference,281 and assailed
lawyers for fighting stereotypes rather than subordination.282 The
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has also come in for criticism,
and rightfully so, for its failure to conceptualize reproductive rights
and pregnancy discrimination as issues pertinent to sex equality,283
its timidity in questioning the injustices underpinning sex-based
distinctions in areas such as military service and sexual assault,284
and its unwillingness to vigorously attack facially sex-neutral laws
that exert a disproportionate impact on women.285 “Intermediate
scrutiny” is derided as irrelevant or infinitely malleable at best,
incoherent and insidious at worst.
Although the history recounted here does not undermine the
force of these critiques by any means, it does suggest an alternative,
and more hopeful, reading of both 1970s legal feminist advocacy
and the sex equality jurisprudence that developed, in fits and
starts, from that advocacy.286 Looking purely at the doctrine that
emerged, one might say that the very partiality of legal feminists’
success in pursuit of “formal equality” had ironic salutary benefits
in that it allowed the Court to develop a middle-ground test that
left a constitutional door open to “genuine affirmative action” for
women, and by extension, for people of color.
The reformulation of the race-sex analogy described in the
preceding Parts suggests, though, that by the mid-1970s, this
development was less ironic than intentional. The story of Webster
and its conscription into the cause of race-based affirmative action
suggests that legal feminist advocacy, especially after 1974, should
281. See Becker, supra note 18, at 253-59; David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating
for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World, 2 L. & INEQ. 33 (1984).
282. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Book Review, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 759 (1987).
283. See supra Part I.C.
284. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1287-88, 1297-1308 (1991).
285. See, for example, the sources cited in Mayeri, A New ERA, supra note 27 (discussing
feminists’ dissatisfaction with the decision in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney).
286. This Article, to borrow the words of Mary Anne Case, “do[es] not mean to suggest that
modern constitutional sex discrimination law sprang full grown from the head of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg like Athena from the head of Zeus.” Case, supra note 243, at 1450. Indeed, other
examples of legal feminist reformulation of the race-sex analogy, which I explore elsewhere,
were the product of a wide range of activists and legal decision makers. See MAYERI,
REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 2.
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be interpreted less as an obsession with removing all sex-based
distinctions from the law than as an emerging plot to convince the
Court to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of
group classifications. That objective was realized in Webster, the
handiwork of one of Ginsburg’s former students, and survived,
whereas a similar principle, so assiduously developed by Justice
Brennan and other proponents of affirmative action, met with much
greater resistance in the context of race.287
Further, the preceding history makes clear that the reformulated
race-sex analogy was more than just an opportunistic use of a more
lenient standard of review in an environment increasingly skeptical
of, if not hostile toward, affirmative action. Although in doctrinal
terms, intermediate scrutiny provided a handy template for
relaxing the requirements for sustaining race-based classifications,
the sex-race analogy was not merely about the mechanical application of a means-ends test. The substantive content of sex equality
jurisprudence placed emphasis on a different set of concerns than
those that troubled foes of “reverse discrimination.” On the one
hand, the use of male plaintiffs underscored how both sexes were
harmed by stereotypes that subordinated women and reinforced
their dependency. But the sort of harms men were alleged to have
suffered in these cases were not deprivations of their own individual opportunities so much as their inability to benefit from their
wives’ economic contributions and their concomitant inability to
perform nontraditional nurturing roles without legal or financial
penalty.288 At the same time, the point that feminist lawyers
consistently drove home in these cases was that women—the truly
disadvantaged sex—were stigmatized and devalued by assumptions
of dependency and inferiority.289 This focus on harm to the disadvantaged group, combined with an acknowledgment that the harms
of discrimination against that group had a universal component,
found its way into the Court’s sex equality decisions.
287. See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text. This may not have been Ginsburg’s
goal from the outset, and indeed others expressed unequivocal opposition to all “benign” sex
classifications. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, “Benign” Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their
Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379 (1980). But Kanowitz’s view was the exception rather than the
rule.
288. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
289. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); see also supra Part II.A
(discussing affirmative action and roles in the family).
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By the same token, after a confusing and seemingly incoherent
series of rulings, the Court—drawing heavily on legal feminists’
analytical tools as well as on theories developed in the race
context—synthesized the principle that, if a sex-based classification
was truly designed to overcome discrimination and to increase
women’s economic opportunities and independence, then differential treatment might be justified.290 The purpose of heightened
scrutiny, on this account, was not to make classification more
difficult for its own sake, but rather to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate classifications on the basis of whether
they had the intent and effect of improving the status of the
previously disadvantaged group.291 The sex equality cases also
incorporated the assumption, never rigorously examined by the
Court,292 that societal discrimination against women was pervasive
and pernicious enough to warrant a legislative response without
specific proof of past discrimination or its present effects.293
Thus, for all its shortcomings, constitutional sex equality
jurisprudence—the product of an ongoing dialogue between
advocates and the Justices (and their clerks)—developed what
arguably was a more compelling and consistent account of the harm
of discrimination and the latitude for its remediation than that
which emerged from race cases. Rather than seeing sex equality
jurisprudence as a pale shadow of race doctrine, then, this history
reveals the potential for mutually beneficial reciprocity between the
two bodies of law. On this view, Bakke is an important marker not
only because Justice Powell’s opinion articulated a new justification
for race-based affirmative action in university admissions that a
majority of the Court would reaffirm a quarter-century later in
Grutter.294 Justice Powell’s role in the rejection of race-sex parallelism is pivotal not only because of his reluctance to embrace strict
290. See supra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
291. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004); Fiss, supra note 159.
292. Except perhaps by Justice Scalia. See supra note 259 (discussing Scalia’s dissent in
Johnson).
293. Cf. Siegel, She the People, supra note 12.
294. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (observing, in light
of Grutter, that “[d]espite years of strife and litigation, the constitutionality of affirmative
action in higher education has now been determined, probably for a generation, along
precisely the lines that Powell laid out in 1978”).
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scrutiny in Frontiero,295 but also for his rebuff of feminists’ reformulated analogy in Bakke.296 Advocate-turned-Justice Ginsburg and
her allies are not only pioneers of formal equal treatment for men
and women but also aspiring architects of substantive sex and race
equality.
This Article is not intended to suggest that this “reverse analogy”
was or is a panacea for race doctrine any more than the original
race-sex parallel provided a flawless conceptual, political, or legal
template for the development of sexual equality law. Indeed, as
Ginsburg herself recognized, descriptive and practical differences
between race and sex inequality abound. Moreover, the utility of
analogical arguments, as I have argued elsewhere, depends not only
on their substantive content— including their scope and descriptive
accuracy—but also on the political, social, and legal context in
which they are invoked.297 Analogical arguments can—though they
need not necessarily—obscure the overlaps, intersections, and
tensions between race and sex inequality. When divorced from
concrete factual situations and political coalitions, analogies can be
doubled-edged if not dangerous. Rather than providing a comprehensive or foolproof solution, my hope is that uncovering alternative
histories of the relationship between race and sex equality in
advocacy and jurisprudence will help us to understand our constitutional past and better imagine our constitutional future.

295. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
296. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302-03 (1978).
297. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 2; Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra
note 2; Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and the
Transformation of Anti-discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187, 226-30 (2006);
see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (observing the double-edged nature of analogies); L. Camille
Hébert, Analogizing Race to Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819
(1997) (arguing that sexual harassment doctrine has constrained the remediation of racial
harassment); Sager, supra note 4.

